


UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN:
HAS THE UNITED STATES ACHIEVED ITS GOALS?



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2005

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

UNITED STATES SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO JORDAN: HAS THE US ACHIEVED ITS GOALS? by LTC John E. Taylor, 141 pages.

This paper studies the US security assistance program to Jordan during the Cold War. There are many publications written about US policy in the Middle East and how the US uses security assistance in its arsenal of tools; and a lot has been written about Jordan and its role within the Middle East. However, covers security assistance to Jordan. This thesis seeks to fill this gap in the literature. To accomplish this, a short history of US security assistance followed by a history of Jordan sets the stage for an analysis of the program from the US perspective. To analyze the program, a set of measures of effectiveness of US security assistance were developed and then applied to Jordan. These measures of effectiveness include: refrain from attacking Israel, promote regime stability and maintain leadership, keep Jordan in the US camp, keep Jordanian military strong, sign a peace treaty with Israel, and promote democracy and regime liberalization. The conclusion of the paper will reveal the US security assistance program to Jordan was effective. The paper will also provide ways to further analyze the program and provide suggestions on how to improve it.

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This project is a labor of love and frustration that started during my assignment to the US Embassy in Amman, Jordan and continued while I was a student at CGSC in 1997 to 1998. It is personally gratifying to see this finally complete.

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ACRONYMS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AECA	Arms Export Control Act
DCS	Direct Commercial Sales
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMFP	Foreign Military Financing Program
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
GAO	General Accounting Office
GOJ	Government of Jordan
GWOT	Global War on Terror
HKJ	Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
IMET	International Military Education and Training
MAP	Military Assistance Program (grant aid)
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
PD	Presidential Doctrine
PDD	Presidential Determination Document
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
SA	Security Assistance

US United States

USAID United States Agency for International Development

USG United States Government

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Of the apparent innovations that various countries have used in the modern practices of foreign policy and war fighting, one that has generated controversy, violent opposition, and passionate support is military assistance. Most contemporary governments have ceased to use military assistance as a distinct element of policy or strategy, and only the United States continues to operate a formal, annually budgeted, military assistance program through a dedicated government agency.¹

William H. Mott IV, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective*, 1999

Introduction

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan² (referred to as Jordan for the rest of this thesis), by its central location and relative stability, is important to the United States (US), the Middle East,³ and the Arab-Israeli peace process. How Jordan became important and why she continues in importance will be discussed in the following pages. Jordan will be used as a case study to examine why the US provides security assistance (SA) and to determine and assess the value of security assistance from the US perspective.⁴

The US has relied on Jordan to provide stability to the Middle East since the 1950s⁵ and continues to do so. To assist Jordan in providing this stability, the US bestows security assistance. The 2005 *Congressional Budget Justification* states, “The US Security Assistance programs--Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET)--buttress Jordan’s ability to maintain secure, peaceful borders with Israel, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Secure borders result in improved security for Israel and for US forces in Iraq and the Arabian Gulf region.”⁶ As

Peter Gubser notes, “Jordan lies in the heart of the Middle East.”⁷ Figure 1 shows that Jordan is located in the middle of one of the most important regions in the world. It is surrounded by nations that have been, at one time or another, Jordan’s friendly neighbors or mortal enemies.



Figure 1. Map of Jordan

Source: CIA, *World Fact Book*, dated 1 January 2004; available from www.cia.org; Internet; accessed on 5 October 2004.

Problem Statement

The US security assistance program with Jordan: Has the US achieved its goals?
 The aim of this thesis is to gauge the effectiveness of the US security assistance program with Jordan during the Cold War era from 1947 to 1991. Effectiveness will be defined by

how well the US government achieved its goals and objectives with Jordan during this time period.

The United States Government (USG) has provided SA to the government of Jordan for six decades. This security assistance has taken the form of grants, loans, training, drawdown equipment, commercial sales, and other items. While this thesis is focused on the Cold War years, it should be noted that between 1953 and 2004,⁸ Jordan received security assistance of just over three billion dollars. Jordan has received an additional four billion dollars in economic aid.⁹ Table 1 displays the funding through fiscal year (FY) 2004. As will be explained in chapter 5, half of the security assistance funds were provided to Jordan after the Cold War ended. There are many categories of assistance, but for this thesis, only money coming under the four official security assistance programs (see glossary for definitions) will be covered. The following figures and the timelines will be discussed in the rest of the thesis.

Table 1. Total Loans and Grants to Jordan

Program Name	Postwar Relief Period 1946-1948	Marshall Plan Period 1949-1952	Mutual Security Act Period 1953-1961	1962-1998	1999-2004	Total FAA Period 1962-2002	Total Loans and Grants 1946-2002
Economic and Military Assistance Loans and Grants	0.0	5.2	296.8	4,098.3	3467.5	7574.8	7876.8

Amounts in millions of dollars.

Source: *US Overseas Loans and Grants* (DISAM Greenbook), dated January 2004, available from www.disam.dsca.mil; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2004.

The goals and objectives of the security assistance program to Jordan have not changed significantly over the years. In 1956, the Eisenhower administration believed that “maintaining a stable, pro-Western government in Jordan . . . [is] a prerequisite to resolving the Palestinian problem and undermining the Soviet influence in the Middle East. Jordan [is] not considered important for its own sake [Israel and Egypt are more important as nations to the US].”¹⁰ The program objective in 1972, under President Nixon, was to “maintain a stable, moderate and independent Arab government and thus encourage a peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli differences.”¹¹ Again outside of the study period but relevant is the 2005 budget request, President Bush took the following position on Jordan: “Its critical location and highly cooperative government make it a linchpin of regional stability and security. . . . Jordan is leading the way as a regional model for democracy, good governance, economic reform and tolerance. . . . Jordan is critical to US security interests in the region.”¹² In all of these assessments and policy statements, Jordan is critical for the location it occupies, for its leadership and stability, and for its relation to the Palestinian issue and Israel. Jordan is valuable by itself but not critical. However, Jordan is not considered to be as important as other nations in the area; Israel and Egypt still occupy the top rung of important Middle East nations to the US and are the top receivers of US aid.

Thesis

With these US foreign policy goals and objectives towards Jordan and the Middle East, questions arise about the US policy. Jordan has participated in three wars against Israel, a critical US ally in the region. Political and social disruption continues in the Middle East. A key question about continuing US aid becomes: Why does the US

promise to support Jordan, a nation that has demonstrated an unwillingness to support US goals and objectives at critical times? The reasons for US support are critical to understanding the security assistance program to Jordan in particular and the overall US program in general.

Research Questions

The primary question is: How effective has the US Security Assistance Program been with Jordan? Secondary questions are: What were the goals and objectives of the program? What US presidential foreign policy doctrine¹³ (see glossary for definition) has driven these goals and objectives? Has Jordan performed according to the goals and objectives of the US? How has Jordan supported with these goals and objectives? How has Jordan not complied? Has the US received sufficient benefits for its support to Jordan? These questions will be answered in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis.

Background

The Middle East emerged as one of the main areas of regional tensions and international conflict in the last half of the twentieth century. The post-World War II environment increased the emphasis on the area with the rise of communism, increased reliance on oil, the formation of the state of Israel, and the transportation network (Eastern Mediterranean, Suez Canal, Persian Gulf, and major air routes). The Middle East is also the birthplace of the three major monotheistic religions of the world (Christianity, Judaism, and Islam). The Middle East was recognized as important by the US in 1947 due to the “tremendous value of the area as a highway by sea, land, and air between East and West.”¹⁴ The US’ “main objective [in the Middle East] is therefore to prevent great

power ambition and rivalries . . . from developing into open conflict . . . which could lead to a third World War.”¹⁵

The creation of Israel in 1948, her relationship with the US, and the five Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982) increased the level of US interest in the Middle East. Other regional conflicts served to intensify US interest: the coup in Iran that overthrew the Shah in 1979; the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988; the Soviet invasion and subsequent war in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988; Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1982; the US Marines in Beirut from 1982 to 1984; Desert Storm in 1991; the rise of terrorism culminating in the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US; and now, the US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these put this area squarely under the microscope of the US. Also, the United States has provided this part of the world the majority of security assistance money expended since the 1970s.¹⁶

Either by geographical location or participation, Jordan has been involved in three of the five Middle East conflicts since 1948. As seen on the map Jordan is surrounded by Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. She lies within a few miles of Lebanon in the north and Egypt in the south. Jordan’s relationship with Israel, involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, and treatment of the Palestinians through the years placed her in a unique position balancing the competing interests among Israel, the Palestinians (internal and external), other Arab nations, and her benefactor, the United States. This assessment is confirmed by the literature reviewed, which includes US policy and monographs spanning the era under investigation.

Literature Review

Primary source literature, including presidential papers, State Department documents, and congressional budget justification requests, provides the basis for analyzing the effectiveness of the security assistance program. These references provide details on the overall goals and objectives of US foreign policy to the specifics of money and equipment provided. Secondary source literature offers the evaluations of US foreign policy and the security assistance program. These sources present anecdotal evidence as well as an evaluation of US programs. Secondary sources on the subject of arms and security assistance span the range of opinions. Some of these sources claim that the US is one of the main causes for world instability because of its arms sales. Others suggest that the only way to secure the world is for the US to continue its arms sales programs. All of the literature reviewed contributes to answering the research questions. The following comments on the literature reviewed convey the breadth and scope of security assistance and Jordan.

US presidential doctrine (Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan), gathered from the *Public Papers of the US Presidents*, provides the starting point of the security assistance program. These doctrines initially came from speeches by the presidents that outlined their view of the world. The volumes of the US Department of State (DOS) *Foreign Relations of the United States* provide insights on the inner workings of the US government and how the security assistance program is carried out. The early years of the Cold War are well covered. However, information regarding the late 1960s to the end of the Cold War has only recently been published. The recently published material is incomplete, lacking memoranda that remain classified.

Additional government documents (e.g., budget requests, strategies, General Accounting Office (GAO) reports, and Congressional, Department of Defense (DOD), DOS, and USAID documents) expand and focus the details and official results of the security assistance program. Budget requests have specific goals and objectives for the coming year and a progress report on the past year. GAO documents primarily focus on problems within the administration of the programs but are useful to provide an understanding of how the programs should work. Congressional reports have the testimonies and provide the details of how and why programs are funded. The other government documents provide background and details of the security assistance program.

Some of the literature provides prescriptive solutions for the US-Jordan security assistance program, but these mainly focus on the broad policy implications of security assistance using country specific examples and not on detailed analysis of the programs. While not part of the timeline of this thesis but impacting the future of the SA program, a new set of books published recently subsequent to 11 September 2001, advocate retooling the SA program, and provide suggestions on how to do it. Two examples are Campbell and Flournoy's *To Prevail* and Gabelnick and Stohl's *Challenging Conventional Wisdom*. These two references focus on reorienting the Cold War mentality of security assistance and reinvigorating congressional oversight of the security assistance program. This recommendation would provide more utility to the SA program and benefit US security. Another perspective formed outside of the timeline of this study, include the author's personal experience as a Security Assistance Officer (SAO) and veteran of Desert Shield, Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Conversations that

took place during the author's tour in Jordan will be used throughout this thesis to suggest status of the military relationship between the two nations.

Many secondary sources report the results of US policy. The following secondary sources will be used to provide the evaluation of the security assistance program. There are few books devoted specifically to Jordan, there are at least eleven authors (Adnan Abu-Odeh, Anthony Cordesman, Mohammad Faddah, Adam Garfinkle, Peter Gubser, Yehuda Lukacs, Madiha Al-Madfa, Helen Metz, Kamal Salibi, David Schenker, and Lawrence Tal) that will be used. Jordan is mentioned in the other sources but does not occupy center stage of the material.

The following books cover security assistance. *Send Guns and Money* by Duncan Clarke, Daniel O'Connor, and Jason Ellis provides an overview of the US security assistance program and how it affects US foreign policy. The authors provide details into the problems Jordan encountered by not supporting the US-led coalition during the first Gulf War which provides insight into the value and importance of US security assistance during the Cold War. Ernest Graves and Steven Hildreth's 1985 *US Security Assistance* is a five-chapter book covering aspects of the US security assistance program from the roles of security assistance and government agencies involved to implications for the future. Ernest Graves served as a director for the Defense Security Assistance Agency from 1978 to 1981. William Hartung's *And Weapons for All* is an indictment on US arms sales to the world, containing a chapter on the Middle East without any real mention of Jordan. The author does cover the US support to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and how those very weapons were eventually used against the US in the first Gulf War. Harold Hovey's *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices*, published in 1965,

provides background on early US security assistance to the world. Small parts of the book are devoted to the Middle East and a few references are made to Jordan. Hovey provides some context for US policy in general rather than Middle East specific information. William H. Mott IV wrote two books on security assistance. The first, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective*, provides a historical analysis of the use of security assistance by citing four examples (two US, one British, and one French). The examples show that security assistance is not a new phenomenon nor is it without its complexities. His second book, *Security Assistance: An Empirical Perspective*, provides an overview of US security assistance policy and conduct during the Cold War. Four chapters cover the following world regions: Middle East, Latin America, East Asia and East Africa. All provide chapters that detail US security assistance in those regions.

Risa Brooks' *Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* provides a transition between security assistance and Jordan. It gives a good background on how Middle East leaders stay in power. The military, tied to the nation's leadership, is the key to regime longevity. Conversely, Brooks provides examples of how this close relationship between political and military leaders can lead to military failure. Brooks compares US security assistance support to these nations and how it helps and also how the support can cause problems. Jordan is used as an example in her thesis.

The next six books cover the history of Jordan, by either by devoting an entire book or a chapter to the nation's history. Hooshang Amirahmadi edited *The US and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives*, a 1993 compilation of thirteen excellent background information chapters on US-Middle East relationships. While Jordan does not rate its own chapter, it is well covered in all of the book's topics. The book addresses

the role of arms transfers in that relationship, support to Israel, and support to various warring factions in that region. *Jordan: A Country Study*, (1991) edited by Helen Metz, is the official country handbook published by the US Government (USG). The book provides good background material for understanding Jordan. It details the US military cooperation with Jordan and addresses the role and importance of the Jordan Armed Forces to the Kingdom of Jordan. Lawrence Tal's *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* provides a detailed overview of these thirteen tumultuous years in Jordan and the Middle East, focusing on how Jordan remained comparatively stable in a very unstable region during this time period. Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe have a short but effective tome titled *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, which aims to provide the reader with "a brief but comprehensive guide to Jordan, . . . which will suggest further reading for a more in depth study."¹⁷ Peter Gubser has written two books on Jordan. The first, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, provides a useful historical overview of Jordan. The second, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, provides a brief account of the important people and occurrences in Jordanian history. Kamal Salibi wrote *The Modern History of Jordan* in an "attempt to reduce the modern history of Jordan into a readable narrative."¹⁸ Salibi also covers the development of the Hashemite monarchy and explains how Jordan has functioned as a nation state since first established.

The following two books provide information on both Jordan and the peace process and transition from the chapter on Jordan to that of the effectiveness of the US security assistance program with Jordan. Adnan Abu-Odeh's *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* is a good history of

Jordan that brings in the Palestinian perspective and how the Palestinians affect Jordan's governmental policy. He delineates the various backgrounds of Jordanians by where they were born. This information is critical to understanding who actually governs and how the government and society operate in Jordan. Madiha Al-Madfa'i's *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, gives a detailed account of the US-Jordan interaction during the 1970s and 1980s. The role of security assistance here is an example of a reward and punishment approach used by the US to entice Jordan in to signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.¹⁹ This book is used to document the 1970s and 1980s in lieu of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series of books.

John A. Cope's *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment* known as McNair Paper 44, provides a valuable framework in which to evaluate the effectiveness of the security assistance programs. This framework, with some modifications, provides a way to measure the general effectiveness of the security assistance program.

The last book provides a way ahead for the US and security assistance in the post 11 September 2001 world and the Global War on Terror. Kurt Campbell and Michele Flournoy's *To Prevail* is a detailed examination of post 11 September 2001 American foreign policy. This volume has sixteen chapters on various aspects of US policy ranging from strengthening Homeland Security to revising foreign assistance, providing a prescriptive improvement for each of these areas. The book finishes with suggested regional strategies.

There are two main patterns in the literature, one from the US government and the other from nongovernmental sources. Other patterns revolve around the Middle East, US

policy in the Middle East, security assistance--positive and negative--in general terms, Jordanian history, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts and peace process. The major gap in the literature is the one this thesis will begin to fill--that of tying Jordan to US security assistance and the effects of that assistance. The literature reviewed answers the secondary research questions posed earlier in this chapter. By answering these secondary research questions, the main research question will be answered. The following section lays out the methodology to answer the research questions is presented here in the research design.

Research Design

The majority of primary source data used for this paper consists of official US government documents. The measures of effectiveness of the security assistance program will be generated from these references and Cope's McNair Paper 44. The measures of effectiveness for this thesis are a compilation and distillation of the sources in the literature reviewed. These measures focus on US foreign policy and reflect the region specific policy. Gauging the effectiveness will be done utilizing government documents and secondary source data that report on the success or failures of the program.

Measures of Effectiveness

The measures of effectiveness for this study are focused on the Cold War period and come from research and were refined using information from the McNair Paper 44.²⁰ These measures will be put into a table (see table 2). The presidential doctrines provide the base of the table.

Effectiveness is defined as:

1. Jordan refrains from attacking Israel in war or conduct cross-border attacks.

2. Maintaining stability and maintaining the leadership status quo in Jordan (the US does not want internal disorder in Jordan or a coup d'etat overthrowing the Hashemite family).

3. Keeping Jordan in the US camp (Jordan cooperates with the US and supports its Middle East policy, including contributing to favorable balances of military power in critical areas).

4. Keeping the Jordanian military strong (military's are the principal power base in most third world countries).²¹

5. Jordan negotiating and signing a peace treaty with Israel.

6. Promoting democracy and regime liberalization in Jordan (e.g., human rights, democracy, and civilian control of the military).

Table 2. Measures of Effectiveness

Refrain from attacking Israel							
Promoting Regime Stability and Maintaining Leadership							
Keeping Jordan in US camp							
Keeping Jordanian Military Strong							
Jordan signs a Peace Treaty with Israel							
Promote Jordanian Democracy and Regime Liberalization							
	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Carter	Reagan

The measures of effectiveness will be evaluated during the terms of the Cold War presidents. The exceptions to this will be the terms of President's Ford and G. H. W. Bush who lacked identifiable doctrine. The ratings will be for the entire period of each term in office. If an event occurred during the term, the rating will be "yes." If it did not occur then the rating will be "no." If the event occurred and then changed back, specifically under the two topics of stability and democracy, then the section will be rated both "yes" and "no". The assessments will be a combination of objective and subjective evaluations. This table will be completed in chapter 5. Completion of this table will answer the research questions presented earlier in this chapter. The primary question--How effective has the US security assistance program been with Jordan?--covers the above mentioned measures. The secondary questions cover the measures--sometimes within the same question. Answering these research questions will allow for the completion of the table and by completing the table the research questions will be answered and the thesis completed.

Organization of Paper

Chapter 1 serves as the introduction to this thesis. A topic introduction and background are provided as well as a literature review. Chapter 2 will cover the history of security assistance and provide the specifics of the program as well as cover the presidential doctrine that helped to shape the security assistance program. Chapter 3 will cover a brief history of Jordan and its importance to the US and to the Middle East. There will be a discussion on SA provided to Jordan as well. Chapter 4 will measure the effectiveness of the security assistance program based on government documents and both government and nongovernment assessments. Chapter 5 will conclude by answering

the research question: How effective has the US security assistance been with Jordan? Future program possibilities will be put forth in the conclusion of the thesis as this region will continue to be one of the main areas of US interest for the foreseeable future.

Summary

This chapter laid out the groundwork for the thesis and a way to measure the effectiveness of the US security assistance program to Jordan. The following chapter provides a brief review of presidential doctrine and security assistance. This will be followed by a chapter on the history of Jordan.

¹William H. Mott IV, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 1.

²The author uses the spelling found in recent publications and developed from his tour in Jordan for the names and places in Jordan's history.

³Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 392. The Middle East as a term will be used to include those nations, of predominantly Moslem culture, on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and on both sides of the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf.

⁴An admission is necessary here. The author was assigned to the US Embassy in Jordan as a Security Assistance Officer from October 1995 to June 1997. This thesis had its genesis in Jordan followed by an attempt to write it during the author's attendance at the 1997-1998 Command and General Staff Officer course at Fort Leavenworth. The author's reassignment to Fort Leavenworth in 2004 allowed for the completion of this work. A more detailed explanation is in the "About the Author" section at the end of the thesis.

⁵Lawrence Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2002), 41.

⁶United States, Agency for International Development, *Congressional Budget Justification*, CBJ 2005 Jordan, 423; accessed 13 December 2004, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ane/jo.html; Internet.

⁷Peter Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Asian Historical Dictionaries, No. 4 (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991), 1.

⁸The cut off for this paper will be the fiscal year 2004 for all funding figures.

⁹United States, Agency for International Development (USAID), *US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, Web address: (<http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/>), accessed on 7 October 2004. And United States, Agency for International Development budget requests for 2003 and 2004 pages 353 and 402 respectively from the Near East Budget Request, “*Congressional Budget Justification*” CBJ 2003 Jordan, (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/fy2003part10.pdf), and United States, Agency for International Development, “*Congressional Budget Justification*” CBJ 2004 Jordan, (www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/fy2004/cbj10-neast.pdf).

¹⁰Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967*, 41.

¹¹United States Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, DOS-AID, Report B-179001 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), 2.

¹²USAID, *Congressional Budget Justification*, CBJ 2005 Jordan, 422.

¹³A body of teachings or instructions and in this case a body of executive decisions fundamental to American foreign policy. Definition of doctrine from www.fact-index.com/d/do/doctrine.html, internet; accessed on 3 November 2004.

¹⁴US Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. 5, *The Near East and Africa* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), 513.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶William H. Mott IV, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 30.

¹⁷Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001), xiii.

¹⁸Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 1.

¹⁹This is outside the thesis time period but provides a good example of US policy.

²⁰John A. Cope, *International Military Education and Training: An Assessment*, McNair Paper number 44, Institute for National Strategic Studies (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1995), 23.

²¹Risa Brooks, *Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi Paper 324, International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1998), Introduction.

CHAPTER 2

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Washington applied military [security] assistance as a functionally focused, reactive instrument to deter aggression, resolve local conflicts, influence regional politics, generate economic growth in recipients and in the United States, maintain alliances, sustain military readiness, and promote American values.¹

Bruce K. Scott, Major General, US Army, “Peace Through Cooperation,” 2000

Introduction

This chapter describes how presidential doctrine is translated into security assistance for a specific nation. The first section will cover presidential doctrine and how this translates into government policy. Subsequently a discussion follows on security assistance and its role with government policy and the effects on the world and the Middle East.

Presidential Doctrine

While not all foreign policy statements coalesce into identifiable presidential doctrine, the forty-four years of the Cold War produced five discernable presidential doctrines of foreign policy and two other foreign policy themes that shaped US Cold War foreign policy. The doctrines were put forth in public speeches, primarily addresses to joint sessions of Congress, where the presidents outlined their doctrine. Some of these generated public laws; however all initiated governmental action. The main doctrines are those from, and identified with, the Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan Administrations. To a lesser degree Kennedy and Johnson provided doctrines as well but the foreign policy of these two administrations are not as strongly identified with the specific president as the other five. These seven doctrines will be the basis for evaluating

the security assistance program to Jordan in this thesis. As Cecil Crabb states in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy* “No nation in modern history has relied so much on doctrinal statements and principles in foreign affairs.”² The following section is a summation of the presidential doctrine that has influenced post World War II US foreign policy and will be referenced in this thesis. Two of these doctrines referred to the Middle East specifically (Eisenhower and Carter). The rest were focused elsewhere but all could be applied in the Middle East. All of these doctrines were implemented in government programs including security assistance.

Truman Doctrine

President Truman outlined the policy that was to bear his name during an address to a joint session of Congress on 12 March 1947 about the crises in Greece and Turkey. The Greek government requested US economic and military assistance to defeat a communist backed insurgency. Turkey sought financial assistance to effect modernization of their military to maintain its national integrity. As President Truman stated “We shall not realize our objectives [to ensure peaceful development of nations, free from coercion], however, unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.”³ This statement clearly lays the foundation for security assistance. The post World War II foreign policy focus under Truman started with the rebuilding of Europe under the Marshall Plan; US actions in Greece, Turkey and finally Korea are examples of the Truman Doctrine.

Eisenhower Doctrine

President Eisenhower's speech to a joint session of Congress on 5 January 1957 addressed a "special situation" in the Middle East, and articulated his security assistance doctrine. Two events triggered this doctrine, the Egypt-Israeli war in 1956 and the manipulation "International Communism" to foment instability in the region. The program had three parts. Part one stated that the US would cooperate and assist any nation in the development of economic strength dedicated to national independence. Second it would authorize programs of military assistance and cooperation with any nation that desired aid. Third it would authorize such assistance and cooperation including the use of the US armed forces to secure and protect the nation requesting support.⁴ The main subject of the speech was the Middle East; however, the doctrine would be applied worldwide to contain the Soviet Union. This doctrine was put to the test in 1958 when the US landed Marines in Lebanon and the US requested that the United Kingdom provide assistance to Jordan during its time of crisis after the coup overthrowing the Hashemite rulers in Iraq.

Kennedy Doctrine

President Kennedy outlined his foreign policy at his inaugural address on 20 January 1961. It was encapsulated by the following quote "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty."⁵ He followed up with action in Cuba with the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis; in Vietnam by expanding the number of advisors from a

few hundred to over 16,000; and in Europe (the Cold War) with the Berlin Wall crisis in 1961.

Johnson Doctrine

President Johnson delivered his foreign policy in a speech to a joint session of Congress on 4 January 1965. While he identified no specific region of the world in the speech he did say “Our concern and interest, compassion and vigilance, extend to every corner of a dwindling planet.” Johnson spoke of Vietnam, Latin America, and communism. He put forth a veiled threat stating “In this period we have built a military power strong enough to meet any threat and destroy any adversary.”⁶ It was during his administration that US support for Israel blossomed in size and stature. What had been a limited program of financial and economic aid to Israel became, after 1966, focused on military aid especially in the aftermath of the June 1967 War.⁷ Vietnam was the main example of this doctrine. The landing of US troops in the Dominican Republic in 1965 to restore order after coups and counter-coups is another example⁸ of his doctrine.

Nixon Doctrine

President Nixon first articulated his doctrine at a press conference on Guam on 25 July 1969 and in a television address to the nation on 3 November 1969. The essence of his doctrine is contained in three points. Point one states the US will keep all its treaty commitments. Point two states the US will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an allied nation whose survival is considered vitally important. Point three states that in cases involving aggression the US will furnish military and economic assistance when requested. However, the requesting nation must assume the primary responsibility of providing for its own defense.⁹ The Vietnamization program in the

Republic of Vietnam illustrates the doctrine as does the US logistic support to Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Carter Doctrine

President Carter had early success in the Middle East by negotiating the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1978-1979. He articulated his doctrine late in his term after the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the coup in Iran that ousted the Shah and seized the US Embassy, taking its staff hostage. Carter spoke to a joint session of Congress in his State of the Union address on 23 January 1980. “Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region [and the Middle East in general] will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”¹⁰ Unfortunately his words rang hollow as he followed up with the disastrous raid in Iran to attempt rescue of the hostages. President Carter attempted to tie US support to human rights issues with his doctrine; however, this policy was often overlooked when providing assistance.

Reagan Doctrine

Two presidential doctrines emerged during the Reagan era. The first came from his speech to Congress on 27 April 1983. While he briefly covered the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, the main focus was Central America, specifically US support for El Salvador in their fight against the Sandinista guerillas of Nicaragua. The second doctrine came from his State of the Union address on 6 February 1985. President Reagan stated “Our security assistance programs help friendly governments defend themselves and give them confidence to work for peace. And I hope that you in Congress will understand that,

dollar for dollar, security assistance contributes as much to global security as our own defense budget.”¹¹ Examples of application of the Reagan Doctrine include US actions in Lebanon, action in Grenada, support for Iraq during their war against Iran, and the re-flagging of the Kuwaiti oil tankers.

What is Security Assistance?

United States security assistance is a group of programs authorized by congressional acts that provide money and articles for defense related issues to foreign nations. This means the US gives money to Jordan so Jordan can spend that money on defense articles produced in the US; in essence and fact the US pays itself for foreign aid. Currently, the program consists of four subprograms: Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, Economic Support Funds, and Peace Keeping Operations (see glossary for complete definitions). As Graves' notes, “the overall goal of US defense and foreign policy since World War II has been to foster a stable, peaceful world conducive to national security, economic prosperity and individual freedom.”¹² The programs mentioned above along with economic aid help the US achieve its goals. The US has many tools in its foreign policy arsenal. One set of tools the US uses is security assistance worldwide to help meet the foreign policy goals and objectives set by presidential administrations. It is currently provided to friendly nations to buttress US security by making the receiving nations militarily, politically, and economically stronger, which in turn strengthens the US.¹³ These friendly nations include NATO countries, non-NATO allies, and important regional powers.

Two aspects of the security assistance program will be discussed in this paper. Both involve the program and how it operates. The first aspect concerns the US

president's view of the program. The security assistance program starts with a presidential administration establishing its foreign policy and giving broad general directions to government agencies tasked with carrying out the policy. From these general statements on foreign policy, goals and objectives are derived. These foreign policy goals and objectives become more focused and specific as they pass through various governmental organizations charged with implementing and executing foreign policy, including the National Security Council, the Department of State (to include the US Agency for International Development) and the Department of Defense.¹⁴ Eventually these end up as the goals and objectives expressed in programs including in the security assistance program for a specific country.

The government works to produce its foreign policy through an informal process graphically depicted in figure 2. At the center is the President of the United States. He may decide on a course of action to fund the security assistance program to Jordan. This usually takes the form of a National Security Study Directive (NSSD).¹⁵ His close advisors provide advice if requested. The advisors may range from close friends to cabinet heads to members of Congress but this is an informal and ad hoc group of people designed to be, depending on the president, anywhere from a sounding board to a murder board at which this policy towards Jordan is discussed.

Once the policy takes shape as an NSSD, it is passed to the next group now called the Executive Office of the President. The National Security Council is the most important of these organizations in relation to foreign policy issues. This section was mandated by Congress to ensure that interagency coordination and advice was provided to the president. The action officers here will study the Jordanian situation in relation (but

not limited) to the following areas: Israel, oil, the Palestinians, and other Arab nations. The Office of Management and Budget is critical as no governmental action occurs without funding. A funding strategy will come from this section. This statement of policy or position, on Jordan, emerging from the Executive Office of the President takes the form of a national security directive. The national security directive prescribes the policies and actions the president wishes implemented and assigns responsibilities and allocates resources accordingly.¹⁶

The national security directive is staffed with the various executive departments and agencies for their action. Here both the State and Defense Departments will develop their plans and will generally cross-talk them beginning at the action officer level and up to, potentially, the secretary level. Some of these national security directives become the basis for presidential doctrine (PD). Not all presidential doctrine go through this procedure. The Truman and Eisenhower doctrines were initiated from the president and sent down for execution.

From there the policy goes to Congress and the appropriate Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees. The policy will also be debated within the Budget and Appropriations committees as well. Once through Congress the policy can be made into statutory law. Influencing all actions are the groups represented by the four arrows on the outside of the policy circles diagram. Policies and information flow throughout these policy circles primarily in the direction of the arrows from the president to his close advisors, etc. However, depending on the policy and the situation, circles may be skipped entirely. Policy development is not a one-way affair through these

policy circles. Policies can move throughout these stages multiple times and are often being worked on by different groups at the same time.¹⁷




Figure 2. Policy Circles

Source: Adapted from Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press), 218.

The US Congress and its role in the SA program is the second aspect. Congress controls the budget and, by law, takes an active interest in which nations get money and how much they receive. Congress passes the legislation to authorize the program. Two publications entitled *Legislation on Foreign Relations* contain the specific legislation that serves as the basis for the program.¹⁸ Congress, of all the government organizations

charged with foreign policy, is most influenced by the four groups outside of the government. As will be shown in this chapter Congress influences the SA program and has directly affected the program with Jordan. Congress translates the national security directives into security assistance programs based on State Department input into country and program specific dollar amounts. The following section contains a short history of security assistance from its beginning and how it has been carried out during the Cold War.

How did Security Assistance begin?

The roots of security assistance can be traced to the fight between isolationism and interventionism as part of its foreign policy direction. These two ideals continue to be at odds.¹⁹ In the early twentieth century the isolationists fought hard to keep the US out of World War I but the US was drawn into the war due to attacks on US shipping.²⁰ The US, following participation in World War I, reverted to its isolationist roots. As war clouds gathered over Europe in the 1930s the anti-war and isolationist rhetoric became more fervent.²¹ Isolationists argued that Nazi Germany and the Axis powers were not a US issue; they concerned Europe only. Congress passed three neutrality acts codifying the US isolationist stance. This rhetoric abated, to a point, when Nazi Germany attacked Poland on 1 September 1939. President Roosevelt asked Congress to repeal the arms embargo in the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936 and 1937 on 21 September 1939.²² The revised act became law on 4 November 1939, which allowed the United Kingdom (UK) and France to buy arms; cash and carry.²³ Initially, the UK and France, and eventually the Free French, were able to pay for the arms but as the war progressed they were unable

to continue payments. Basing rights were included in these agreements as well. From 1941 until the end of the war the equipment they received was on a lend-lease basis.

The Lend-Lease law itself was enacted on 11 March 1941. It stated that the President may “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend or otherwise dispose of” defense articles to any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the US.²⁴ The US extended Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union in November of 1941.²⁵ This agreement provided equipment to Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and China to counter Germany and Japan. It helped to repel the Axis Powers while the US initially stayed out of the conflict; it also provided the ability to keep a second front open against the enemy. Lend-Lease enabled the US to support the war effort with materiel and financial aid without becoming directly involved in the fighting. This policy established an important basis for future foreign policies of having other nations fight and secure themselves while the US provided the means to do so. The Lend-Lease program, as it became known, was the precursor to the SA program.

After the end of World War II, President Truman faced a new threat in an expanding communist threat, especially in Europe. He laid out the principles of what would eventually become SA with his doctrine. The Truman Doctrine’s goal was to help Greece and Turkey build up internally to overcome communist threats. The US provided Turkey economic aid and Greece economic and military aid. This became the Greece-Turkey Aid Act of 1947. Its purpose was to counter the Soviet threat. The priority in the post-World War II era involved stopping communist inroads into friendly nations, which eventually evolved into containment of the Soviet Union. Containment or countering the

Soviet threat was the main US foreign policy objective until 1991. Presidential doctrine defined US foreign policy throughout this era.

When did Security Assistance begin?

Security Assistance has been in use for seven decades “to promote the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the US by assisting peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic and external security, and for other purposes.”²⁶ The security assistance program started in 1949 with the passage of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (PL 81-329), which created the Military Assistance Program and the authority for Foreign Military Cash Sales.²⁷ This program was developed to provide strength to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) a new collective defense system started in 1949.²⁸ Graves states the Mutual Defense Assistance Act was significant for two reasons. First, it gave the US authority to provide military assistance to NATO and other nations, to include Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines. And second it established the legal basis for the SA programs.²⁹ From this small beginning the program has grown substantially from two nations receiving SA to over ninety and from four hundred million dollars to over four billion dollars funding annually.³⁰ See appendix B for the major security assistance legislation history of the Cold War.

Why Security Assistance?

Presidential doctrines and US foreign policy must be translated into concrete action, which may take the form of security assistance. Security assistance is a program designed to benefit military organizations of the receiving nations, but the US executive branch uses SA programs to achieve goals beyond those focused on the indigenous military. Economic support is critical to the nations receiving the aid and currently totals,

monetarily, one third of the four SA program's total budgets.³¹ During the Cold War the US sought to contain the Soviet Union. The least costly way to do this was to provide money, training, and equipment to friendly nations, especially those neighboring the Soviet Union and its allies. The US would contain the Soviet Union by proxy instead of by maintaining a larger and more expensive standing military. This was critical during the Korean and Vietnam Wars as the attention of the US was on Asia and not on the European continent.

What is US Security Assistance Policy?

Security assistance is used by the US to promote US foreign policy around the world. As noted earlier, SA is an instrument to “deter aggression, resolve conflict, influence regional politics, and generate economic growth.”³² Two main themes of post World War II US foreign policy were containment of the Soviet Union and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). These two focuses or themes converged many times within the Middle East but were presented as distinct policies.

General

Security assistance followed four distinct phases during the Cold War. Phase one began in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine and carried through 1955 and is known as the Mutual Security era.³³ This phase reflected the US response to the increasing Soviet threat and interest in the rebuilding of Europe. Security assistance was used to accomplish both of these tasks. Phase two began in 1955 and went until the late 1960's. The focus here was on economic development and counterinsurgency.³⁴ Here the US sought to win friends and allies in competition with the Soviet Union. Security or military assistance became the primary vehicle of assistance over relief aid. Phase three began in

1970 and went through 1981 focusing on basic human needs and détente'.³⁵ This phase represented the reaction to the political and perceived military failure of the Vietnam War. The use of military aid was seen as discredited and the focus shifted to economic aid to alleviate poverty. The last phase, Phase four, began under President Reagan and involved the re-emergence of security assistance. Although not named, this phase resembled the Nixon Doctrine.³⁶ Military assistance was restored as a foreign policy instrument. President Reagan confirmed the utility of using SA over the commitment of US soldiers to execute foreign policy.

While each Cold War President modified the goals and objectives of US foreign policy, the overall goal remained containment of the Soviet Union. Since the goal was a cold versus hot war and with the danger of a proxy war escalating, the US used indirect methods of containment. SA was the primary vehicle for this policy.³⁷ As later developed however, the onus was placed on the receiving nation to do the actual work as the US provided money, training, and equipment. As time progressed some additional compliance qualifications were added to the program such as human rights issues and democracy under President Carter. While aid was provided to the receiving nation to enable it to support and defend itself, the US, starting with Eisenhower, reserved the right to intervene where and when necessary when the president felt US national interests were threatened. The first instance of this was the 1958 landing of Marines in Lebanon to help restore order and prevent a civil war.³⁸

The goals and objectives of US policy are laid out well and generally understood; however, the actual execution of this policy can be different. As Dobson and Marsh point out in one example, Truman's foreign policy in the Middle East "followed a pattern of

diplomatic schizophrenia that characterized America's policy in the region much of the Cold War.”³⁹ This schizophrenia was manifested in US attempts to assist both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was not the last time the charge would surface.⁴⁰ The Truman and Eisenhower Doctrines (1947 and 1957 respectively) were the initial USG policies and thereby the gage by which to measure assistance.

Middle East

Following the allied victory in World War II, the United Kingdom and France surrendered leadership in the Middle East to the US. Neither European nation was able to maintain its empire; the US gradually accepted this role, not as an empire builder but as a supporter of friendly nations. Initially, this role was laid out in the Truman Doctrine but was not finalized until the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957. Three factors provided the basis for US foreign policy. The first was containment of the Soviet Union. The second was securing access to Middle Eastern oil. The third was the establishment and subsequent preservation of the Jewish state of Israel.⁴¹ Oil and Israel were the two priorities for the US in the Middle East.⁴² As a result, the US policy in the Middle East up to 1973 was to maintain stability in the Middle East.⁴³ This policy had three specific goals:

1. Maintain good relations with all Middle East states and stimulate a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
2. Neutralize Soviet influence in the Middle East and prevent polarization of the area.
3. Protect oil sources in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.⁴⁴

Since 1948, with the establishment of Israel, the US policy has been, primarily, to maintain peace and stability between the Israelis and the Arabs. The US has walked a fine

line between the two camps, which has not endeared it to either group.⁴⁵ The Palestinian people were also critical to this whole process as they are part of both Israel and Jordan.⁴⁶ From President Truman throughout the Cold War and into the Reagan administration the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP)⁴⁷ has been another key US foreign policy focus. SA was a tool to achieve this. The Camp David accords in 1978-1979 when Israel and Egypt signed their peace treaty provided the first positive result of the MEPP. As part of the accords agreement, the US has provided both Israel and Egypt over one billion dollars annually in SA.⁴⁸

The US has supported several Middle Eastern nations with SA since the end of World War II. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Israel and Egypt have received the bulk of security assistance and support in a non-hostile environment. The following three nations: Lebanon in 1958 and 1982 and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1990 to 1991 (Desert Storm), were supported with both SA and US servicemen.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's expansion and promotion of communism and the US opposition to these policies was the reason for the Cold War. Containment of their policies began with President Truman and ended when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Each president focused on this issue. Two, Eisenhower and Carter, spoke of it and used their doctrine to counteract it in the Middle East. All presidents sought to prevent any Soviet inroads in to the region to protect the oil supply and Israel.

Oil

One of the United States' continuing interests since the early Twentieth Century had been securing access to Middle Eastern oil. Middle East oil is: inexpensive to

acquire, large quantities of reserves, and ease of access. US companies had been in Saudi Arabia and Iran since the 1920's.⁴⁹ The US government felt an obligation to ensure the US companies had the ability to obtain the oil, which was cheaper than oil elsewhere in the world.⁵⁰ Oil became the main focus of US Middle East policy with the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration⁵¹ and both Little and Milton-Edwards assert that oil is the number one priority for the US.⁵² Quandt states that the US had to protect oil from the Soviet threat real or perceived and counter the nationalist threat to friendly nations.⁵³ However, US dependence on Middle East oil did not start until the 1970s. Earlier the US protected European and Asian access to the oil and transportation routes to assist their reconstruction following World War II.⁵⁴ The US was interested in ensuring the sea routes from the Persian Gulf remained open so Europe and Japan could continue to receive shipments of oil. Oil helped, initially, fuel the Marshall Plan for Europe. By the 1956 Suez crisis, Middle Eastern oil was not only supporting Europe but Japan as well.⁵⁵ Up to the 1970's the US not did rely on ME oil to fuel itself but sky rocketing usage required more imports.⁵⁶ One third of all oil used in the US in 1972 came from the Middle East, up from the 10% used previously.

Commitment to Israel

The US was the first government to recognize the new Jewish state on 14 May 1948.⁵⁷ While the US provided limited economic and military support to Israel from the beginning, it was not until just prior to the 1967 war that this support blossomed into the military support Israel now receives. Funding for this support is cemented in law and known as an “earmark.”⁵⁸ Israel has been one of the central focuses of US Middle East policy since the 1960s.⁵⁹ That is not to say it has been a close relationship, but it has been

effective in helping Israelis preserve their security. The US considers Israel to be the only democracy in the region and the US's "special friend".⁶⁰ Middle East Peace (meaning Arab peace with Israel) was the number one goal for Presidential administrations going back to Truman. One of the issues with SA and in reality the US national policy has been the ways this program and the foreign policy have been carried out with the focus on Israel to the detriment of other nations. All Arab Middle East nations and concerns are of lesser importance to the US; however, these factors complicate the overall US Middle East policy picture.⁶¹

Jordan, with a sometimes hostile population, has the longest border of any nation with Israel, which had caused Israel to focus its army on three fronts (south towards Egypt, east towards Jordan, and north and northeast towards Lebanon and Syria). The Egypt-Israeli peace treaty in 1978 and the UN Peacekeepers in the Sinai removed the southern threat. The northern and eastern threats remained throughout the Cold War.

Israel has helped the US with Jordan on a number of occasions, most notably in 1958 when Israel allowed over flights of British aircraft delivering soldiers to Jordan to help stabilize the government in the aftermath of the Iraqi Coup and concern that Jordan would be overthrown next.⁶² Israel was ready to step in during the 1970-1971 civil war and support the King but did not as the crisis abated and due to fears of potential escalation.⁶³

Summary

This chapter covered the creation of US foreign policy from presidential doctrine and how it is translated into a security assistance program. The next chapter covers the

history of Jordan and the following chapter will describe the security assistance program with Jordan.

¹Bruce K. Scott, Major General, US Army, “Peace Through Cooperation,” *Army* 50(6) (June 2000): 33-38; 34-35, quoted in William H. Mott IV, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 19.

²Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Doctrine of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 2.

³United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1963), Harry S. Truman, 1947, 176-180.

⁴United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1958), Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, 6-16.

⁵United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1962), John F. Kennedy, 1961, 1-2.

⁶United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1966), vol. 1 and 2, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, 60.

⁷Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed. (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 401-402.

⁸Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, 5th ed. vol. 2 (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 345.

⁹United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1971), Richard M. Nixon, 1969, 901-909.

¹⁰United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1981), Jimmy Carter, 1980, 194-200.

¹¹United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1984), Ronald W. Reagan, 1983, 601-607; and United States President, *Public*

Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, DC: Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1988), Ronald W. Reagan, 1985, 200.

¹²Ernest Graves and Steven A. Hildreth, *US Security Assistance: The Political Process* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 1.

¹³*National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: USGPO, 2002) iv and 6; and *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2004), 7, 9, 10; and US Department of State and US Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan FY 2004-2009*, DOS/AID Publication 11084 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2003), 1 and 2.

¹⁴Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), 1-17; and Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 64-142.

¹⁵Jordan, Taylor, Mazarr, *American National Security*, 221.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., 217-219.

¹⁸United States, Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002*, vol. 1-A (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2003) and United States, Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002*, vol. 1-B (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2003).

¹⁹Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, 3.

²⁰Ibid., 4.

²¹Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, 131-133.

²²Ibid., 133.

²³Ibid., 178.

²⁴Ibid., 179-181.

²⁵Ibid., 181; and Harold A. Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 4.

²⁶Congress, *Legislation on Foreign Relations Through 2002*, vol. 1-A, 18.

²⁷William H. Mott IV, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 6; and Graves, and Hildreth, *US Security*

Assistance: The Political Process, 7, 183; and Hovey, *United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices*, 8.

²⁸Graves and Hildreth, *US Security Assistance: The Political Process*, 6.

²⁹Ibid., 7.

³⁰President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Harry S. Truman, 176-180; and USAID FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request, accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/summary_tables_table1.pdf, accessed 13 December 2004.

³¹Graves and Hildreth, *US Security Assistance: The Political Process*, 107.

³²Scott, “Peace Through Cooperation,” 34-35, quoted in Mott IV, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective*, 19.

³³Mott IV, *Military Assistance: An Operational Perspective*, 6.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 7.

³⁶Ibid., 8.

³⁷Mott IV, *United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective*, 6.

³⁸Orna Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 169-171.

³⁹Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, 94.

⁴⁰As will be seen later in this thesis, US policy did not follow a clear path.

⁴¹Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., *The US and the Middle East: A Search for New Perspectives* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1993), 35-37.

⁴²Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 394.

⁴³United States Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, DOS-AID, Report # B-179001 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), 2.

⁴⁴Ibid., 25.

⁴⁵Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 394; and Dobson and Marsh, *US Foreign Policy since 1945*, 95.

⁴⁶The Palestinians will be dealt with in chapter three as they and Jordan are intertwined.

⁴⁷MEPP or Middle East Peace Process is a recent term. However, for this paper it will be used regardless of time.

⁴⁸Graves and Hildreth, *US Security Assistance: The Political Process*, 38 and 78.

⁴⁹Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 46-47.

⁵⁰Ibid., chapter 2.

⁵¹Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 394.

⁵²Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, chapter 2; and Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945*, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 38-39.

⁵³William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 12-13.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*, 53, 58-60.

⁵⁶Ibid., 65.

⁵⁷Paterson, Clifford, and Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, 244. President Truman extended recognition just nine minutes after Israel declared her independence.

⁵⁸Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, *Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and US Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger 1997), 110.

⁵⁹Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 394.

⁶⁰Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945*, 38.

⁶¹See Jordan's *American National Security* and Paterson's *American Foreign Relations* for discussions on this topic.

⁶²Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez*, 184-186.

⁶³Jordan, Taylor, and Mazarr, *American National Security*, 401.

CHAPTER 3

JORDAN

Jordan . . . was an artificial creation designed as a cheap sop to Arab nationalist ambition envisioned by the Hashemites of the Hejaz. From such paltry beginnings, however, the Hashemites, under King Abdullah and then his grandson King Hussein, carved out a nation state whose future [h]as now been assured with the smooth succession of Hussein's son Abdullah II in February 1999.¹

Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 2001

Jordan's geographic position is important for two reasons. First, it is a moderate buffer state that separates significant portions of Israeli and Saudi territory from radical Iraq and Syria. If one or both of these radical Arab states absorbed Jordan or if it became a radical state itself as the result of internal revolution, the security of Israel and the petroleum-rich peninsula regimes would be adversely affected. Second, as the country most susceptible to Israeli action across a lengthy common border and the most affected by the creation of Israel, Jordan has a claim to the backing of its Arab neighbors. Thus, Jordan is a natural staging area for Arab activity and is a source of strategic concern to the Israelis.²

United States, Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 1973

Introduction

Jordan is the subject of this chapter. The first two chapters laid out the ground work of this thesis and then covered how US foreign policy is developed into a security assistance program. Jordanian history and its role in the Middle East will be covered. The Jordan-US relationship and security assistance will be scrutinized and described. The effects of this security assistance will be covered in chapter 4.

Support for Jordan

Since US presidents generally supported King Abdullah I and King Hussein and their views on the Middle East, two priorities trumped American support for Jordan during the Cold War: oil and Israel. However, Jordan was vitally important to the US by

itself and critical when oil and Israel were added to the equation. The US provided Jordan with security assistance throughout the Cold War beginning in 1949 although the formal program was not established until later. The 1973 Comptroller report stated “The US military assistance program to Jordan was established in June 1957 by presidential order. The current program objective is to help Jordan build and maintain an armed force strong enough to withstand both internal and external aggression.”³ President Reagan stated in November 1981 “the preservation of Jordan’s security, integrity and its unique character remains a matter of the highest importance.”⁴

The US recognized Jordan on 31 January 1949⁵ after the UN did the same in 1948.⁶ Jordan, from 1949 to 1952, received 5.2 million dollars of economic assistance grants and loans from the US. The first security assistance geared towards Jordan’s army was provided in 1953⁷ although the US did not become fully involved with Jordan until 1957 when it replaced Britain as the main source of foreign aid to Jordan.⁸ Jordan, starting in 1957, began receiving US military grants and loans and has continued to receive this support (grant aid, debt forgiveness, draw downs, training, and FMS etc.) all under the umbrella of security assistance; Jordan received over three billion dollars in funds, equipment and training during the Cold War. Equipment provided to Jordan includes M60A3 tanks, UH-1 utility helicopters, AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, UH-60 Blackhawk utility helicopters, and F-16 fighters.⁹ The military training provided ranges from equipment specific training done in country to Jordanian officers attending US military schools at all levels to include Command and General Staff Courses and War Colleges. SA has provided the opportunity for Jordan’s army to develop and maintain its fighting edge through yearly exercises and numerous peacekeeping operations.¹⁰ There

are yearly exercises with the US Marine Corps, US Navy, and US Army on the scale of two or three thousand US servicemen participating. A brief history of Jordan is now necessary to explain how it became important, first to the British and second to the US.¹¹

What is Jordan?

Jordan was created at the end of World War I by the British and French governments with the agreement of the League of Nations.¹² David Fromkin charges, in *A Peace to End all Peace*, that the World War I time frame “was an era in which the Middle Eastern countries and frontiers were fabricated in Europe. Iraq and what we now call Jordan, for example, were British inventions, lines drawn on an empty map by British politicians after the First World War; while the boundaries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq were established by a British civil servant in 1922”¹³ No one took into account tribal concerns or routes used by Bedouins when establishing the boundaries.¹⁴ While people had lived on the land that Jordan occupies for thousands of years, Jordan as a nation has existed for less than ninety years. She was unlucky in placement with no oil reserves and little water, which produced a lack of arable land, but extremely fortunate to be ruled by intelligent, moderate, and most importantly, shrewd members of the Hashemite family. The family is descended from Hashem, the great grandfather of the Prophet Mohammed¹⁵ and from Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter.¹⁶

As seen on the map on page 2 in chapter 1, Jordan lies in the heart of the Middle East. Initially part of the British Mandate of Palestine, it was renamed Transjordan in 1922 by the League of Nations as excepted from the Mandate of Palestine. See maps at appendix C for further clarification. Britain formally recognized the Emirate of Transjordan in May of 1923, as an independent constitutional state.¹⁷ Bordered on the

west by the Jordan River, the nation covers approximately 35,000 square miles.¹⁸ Other than the Jordan-Israel border, Jordan River and rift valley, and the Yarmuk River-Syria border, Jordan's borders with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and for most of Syria do not follow any well-defined natural terrain features.¹⁹

Jordan lacks arable land; only three percent of the total can be used for crops, which is located along the Jordan River valley.²⁰ The high desert in East Jordan is sparsely populated. The main population centers are located on the high plain just east of the Jordan River valley. The main cities include Amman and Zarqa.²¹ This highly populated area containing most of the production capabilities in the nation rests in an area only thirty by one hundred miles in size.²² This places the main population within minutes by air from both Israel and Syria and leads to the necessity of a strong and mobile military and a good air defense system.

Transjordan from 1916 to 1946 under the British Mandate

How was Jordan created?

The history of the making of Jordan is confusing and reads more like a soap opera than something that nations with the stature of Great Britain and France or the infant League of Nations would construct. Intrigue, lies, half-truths, broken promises, empire building, a Jewish homeland, rewarding the Arab allies of World War I, Arab nationalism, and dividing up the former Ottoman Empire all contributed to the process of creating Jordan.²³

Hussein ibn Ali ruled the Hejaz, the mountainous, western section of the Arabian Peninsula bordering the Red Sea. Both Mecca and Medina are located in this area.²⁴ He ruled on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan from 1908 through the Arab Revolt during World

War I.²⁵ He was the Sherif of Mecca and its Emir. To be a sheriff or notable, the individual must be a descendent of the Prophet Mohammed, a member of the house of Hashem.²⁶ Each of Sherif Hussein's three sons, Ali, Feisal, and Abdullah would play an important political role after World War I. Sherif Hussein, Emir of Mecca, ruled over the land under the Ottomans. Two of his sons, Feisal and Abdullah, were ambitious and wanted Arab lands of their own. World War I increased the speed of change in this area. Sherif Hussein lead the Arab army, "spiritually,"²⁷ and Feisal lead the Arab ground forces²⁸ along with the British General Allenby and T. E. Lawrence, to conquer the area of Palestine, East Jordan and Syria from the Ottomans.²⁹ Ali, the eldest became Sherif of Mecca in 1924 but was deposed by the Saud family in 1925 as they consolidated power and territory into what is known as Saudi Arabia.³⁰ Placing the Hashemites, particularly Emir Abdullah, in Jordan caused fighting between the House of Saud and the House of Hashem. Saud attacked Jordan in 1922 and was crushed by the British. The British partitioning of the Arabian Desert caused this problem.³¹

The creation of Jordan, like the rest of the Middle East as we know it today, emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The victors of World War I divided the former empire in order to arrest the chaos of the area. A series of agreements were made during the war years between various parties to include Great Britain, France, Jewish organizations and the Arabs. There were at least two competing demands that were diametrically opposed; that of Arab nationalism and placement of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East.³² The focus of these agreements was on the establishment of a Jewish homeland in what was known as Palestine.

Palestine referred to the land between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River (see maps in appendix C). The area to the east of the Jordan became known as Transjordan.³³ The *Sykes-Picot Agreement* of 15-16 May 1916 laid out an agreement between the British and French Governments on the post-war division of the Middle East. The agreement gave Palestine (to include Transjordan) and Iraq to Britain, and Syria and Lebanon to the French.³⁴ The *Balfour Declaration* was a short letter from the British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild of a British Zionist organization, dated 2 November 1917, stating that Britain agreed to support a home for the Jews in Palestine and “it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine”³⁵

The League of Nations Mandate of 24 June 1922 was the end result of these agreements which were completed on 24 April 1920 at the San Remo Conference by the Supreme Allied Council at San Remo, Italy. The mandate agreed with the *Balfour Declaration* in terms of the lay out of the land and the creation of a Jewish homeland. The mandatory power was to set up to administer the area using local nationals as much as possible and one of the provisos, directly lifted from the *Balfour Declaration*, was to not disturb the indigenous people of the land. Article 25 mentions the land that became Transjordan as the land between the Jordan [river] and Eastern boundary.³⁶

The lands formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire were assigned to Mandatory Powers as administrators. France received the mandate for Lebanon; Britain received the mandate for Palestine. Emir Feisal ruled Syria, which included East Jordan. France objected to Feisal’s presence in Syria and forced him into a one-year exile on 25 July 1920. After this, Britain claimed East Jordan as part of their mandate of Palestine. During

this time Abdullah moved north from Mecca and began to tour East Jordan. The British determined their policy and, after an interview with Winston Churchill, eventually gave Iraq to Emir Feisal and allowed Abdullah to stay in East Jordan as its Emir. All this was finalized on 21 March 1921.³⁷

Transjordan at its inception was a small nation consisting of less than four hundred thousand inhabitants. As noted earlier, the main population centers were on the high plain, centered on Amman. Britain recognized Transjordan in 1923 as a state preparing for independence under British sponsorship. A constitution, named the Organic Law, was produced in 1928, which was a necessary step towards self-government. During these years the army was created and became known as the Arab Legion. Initially it was under the command of British General F.G. Peake or Peake Pasha who held command until his retirement in 1939 at which time his deputy, General Sir John Bagot Glubb or Glubb Pasha took command. The Arab Legion was initially developed as a frontier police force that evolved into the army.³⁸ World War II saw Transjordan assisting the defeat of the Vichy French organization in Syria. In 1946 the Treaty of London was signed where Transjordan was proclaimed a kingdom and Abdullah crowned king.

Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan since 1946.

End of the British Mandate

The British Mandate for Transjordan ended in March 1946.³⁹ Britain could no longer afford to support its empire as money and effort was needed to rebuild its homeland after the devastation caused by World War II and agreed to end the Mandate. However, while the mandate was over, Britain continued to support Jordan with military

aid. Over one-half of the aid that Jordan received up to 1957 was supplied by Great Britain and command of the army was still in the hands of General Glubb Pasha.⁴⁰ Emir Abdullah crowned himself King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan on 22 May 1946.⁴¹ After annexing the West Bank following the 1948 war with Israel, the Kingdom was renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1949.⁴² King Abdullah was assassinated at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 20 July 1951 by a Palestinian upset about the alleged collusion between Jordan and Israel concerning the disposition of the Palestinians. His grandson, Hussein, witnessed the murder.⁴³ At the time of Abdullah's assassination, his eldest son, Talal, was in Switzerland receiving treatments for schizophrenia. Talal returned to Jordan and took over the crown and government but only ruled for one year. He abdicated the throne in August 1952 based on his mental illness.⁴⁴

Ascension and reign of Hussein

Hussein was a student at Harrow in Britain when his father, Talal abdicated. Hussein returned to Jordan to replace his father. Given that Hussein had yet to turn eighteen, a regency was formed to rule on his behalf. Hussein moved back to Britain and attended the British Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst for a year. He was crowned King in May 1953 upon reaching his eighteenth birthday.⁴⁵

One of the first tests of King Hussein's leadership was the removal of General Glubb and placing East Bank Jordanians in control of the military in 1956. General Glubb had commanded the Jordan Army since 1939; he was the last vestige of British control in Jordan. He and Peake Pasha had built the Arab Legion into the best-trained Arab army. Replacing Glubb was done in reaction⁴⁶ to the British led Baghdad Pact (see glossary). While King Hussein wanted to join the pact, as financial and military

assistance was offered by Britain, the forces of Arab nationalism defeated him in the streets of Jordan.⁴⁷ King Hussein, as a concession to his people, showed his independence from Britain by removing Glubb and other British officers in command of the Arab Legion. King Hussein subsequently renamed the legion as the Jordan Arab Army.⁴⁸

Role with Israel

The first of two major sources of instability come from Jordan's relations with Israel. Jordan fought in three wars against Israel that occurred in 1948, 1967, and 1973. While involved in the Arab-Israeli conflicts, Jordan does not have the long detailed history of outright aggression with Israel that Egypt or Syria have in their wars against Israel. Jordan was a participant in the wars but not an instigator of conflict. Jordan first fought the Israelis in 1948. After the conflict Jordan occupied, then annexed, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Jordan gained over 300,000 refugees, subsequently called Palestinians who moved or were forced out of Israel. The Arab Legion fought better than any Arab army in 1948.⁴⁹

Jordan did not participate in the Suez crisis in 1956 when the Israelis, with collusion and participation from France and Great Britain, attacked the Egyptians. The US forced France and the UK out of Egyptian territory and Israel as well.⁵⁰ This began the period of pan-Arabism whose chief architect was President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. Nasser ruled Egypt from 1952 to 1970.⁵¹ He was a nationalist who wanted foreign powers out of Egypt and the Middle East. Primarily this was directed against the British but applied to all western powers to include France and eventually the US. The Palestinian members of the Jordanian population were upset with King Hussein and

thought he was a stooge of the west because of British and American support. King Hussein removed Glubb as the head of the army and replaced him with an East Bank Jordanian. However, King Hussein realized he and Jordan could not survive without some kind of foreign aid. He asked the US to help Jordan with military and economic aid to replace the aid the UK had been providing. This era was a testing ground for King Hussein. The Suez crisis, the coup in Iraq that threatened to extend to Jordan in 1958, and loyalty issues of the Jordanian army were all handled well by the young king.⁵²

Jordan fought in the 1967 war allied with Egypt and Syria against Israel. King Hussein did not want to fight but felt he had to under pressure from both Egypt and Syria. This proved to be very costly and was considered a military disaster for Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. Jordan's air force was destroyed on the ground by Israeli jets. Her army was defeated and pushed back across to the east bank of the Jordan River.⁵³ The war left the Jordan in military ruin.⁵⁴ Jordan lost the West Bank and east Jerusalem and gained another 400,000 refugees. The "bread basket" of the Jordan River valley's west bank was lost and the number of refugees that came over after the fighting had a large negative impact on Jordan's economy.

Jordan participated in the 1973 war although, only with one brigade, late in the war, in Syria.⁵⁵ Jordan's impact in the war was minimal. King Hussein participated only to keep up appearances with other Arab nations. Jordan did not benefit from the war as did Egypt and Syria but it also did not get punished as it did after 1967 by the US.⁵⁶

Role with Palestinians

The second of the two major sources of instability come from its Palestinian population. Jordan has worked hard at the Palestinian issue and with good reason.

Palestinians comprise anywhere from one half to three quarters of the Jordanian population.⁵⁷ The main source of refugees came from the 1948 and 1967 wars. Losing the West Bank in 1967; fighting the civil war with the PLO in 1970 and into 1971; and enduring attacks from Israel in retaliation for PLO attacks (stopped after Battle of Karama in 1968) are all related to the Palestinians.

Jordan fought a Civil War against the PLO in 1970-1971. This crisis almost destabilized Jordan until King Hussein ordered the PLO forcibly removed. By mid 1970 the fedayeen (Palestinian commandos) roamed freely about the country acting as a government (albeit lawless) within a government. They became more of a threat to Jordan than to Israel. In September 1970 King Hussein ordered the army to drive them out of Jordan. Fierce fighting erupted and lasted for two weeks, which included Syrian tanks invading Jordan, until a truce was signed. By July of 1971 the PLO had been entirely eradicated from Jordan.⁵⁸ This was the monarchy's most important test for ruling legitimacy and survival.

Palestinians have proven to be one of the most complex issues in the Middle East. Wherever the leadership of the PLO goes problems arise. This has repeated itself in Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, and finally Gaza. Percentage wise very few of the “refugees” from the 1948 or even the 1967 wars are still alive when compared to the overall Palestinian population; the rest are native born Jordanians although they still keep the Palestinian ethnicity and identity.⁵⁹ Their relationship with Jordan has had its complications. However, the Palestinians mostly supported the Hashemites; the Palestinians realized it was in their best interest to do so. Only a small minority caused problems (the PLO) and had to be dealt with.

The Palestinians consist of those from the West Bank that Jordan occupied and annexed as a result of the 1948 war.⁶⁰ Other Palestinians fled to Jordan following the 1967 war. See table 3 for refugee numbers. Palestinians consist of two groups--those who still reside in Refugee Camps, who are poor and are easily swayed into disliking the Hashemite regime, and those that have been assimilated; businessmen and entrepreneurs. This group is educated and fairly westernized. They often worked outside of Jordan in both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (prior to 1990) and who sent money back home. That stopped after King Hussein's non-support of the US lead coalition in 1991 to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait.

Table 3. Refugees in Jordan

Location	After 1948 War	After 1967 War	Total Number of Refugees in 1972
East Bank	332,000	494,000	558,000
West Bank	390,000	254,000	281,000
Total			839,000

Source: US Comptroller, *Summary of United States Assistance to Jordan* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), 17-19.

Why is Jordan important?

Jordan has proven to be the one constant in an ever-changing area. Jordan and its role in relation to Israel and the Arab-Israeli conflict and its handling of the Palestinians through the years placed it in a unique position. It must weigh its role in the region and the world versus its internal population which is about half Palestinian. Jordan has actual and potential enemies both inside and outside her borders and has fought them both over

the years. Although official Jordanian government census data does not account for ethnic origin, it is unofficially recognized that over one-half of Jordan's population is made up of people of Palestinian descent.⁶¹ (There are counter charges to this figure.⁶²) Suffice it to say that approximately half of the population is of Palestinian descent.⁶³ Jordan's relationship to the US and other western nations also influences her standing in the Middle East. Since Jordan receives assistance from other Arab nations including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, it must be careful not to appear too close to the US less Jordan lose the support of other friendly Arab nations. For the most part US Presidents and Congress have been supportive of King Hussein and his views on the Middle East. Exceptions to this trend include the following: 1967 and the immediate aftermath of the six day war; 1978-1979 during the peace talks at Camp David when Jordan did not participate; and again in 1990-1991 when Jordan did not participate during the first Iraq war by trying to play peacemaker with everyone involved.⁶⁴

As noted in chapter 1 the written goals and objectives with Jordan have always been clear. Examples of these include: peace with Israel, staying in control its of own population, stability with the Palestinians, secure borders with neighboring nations, and maintaining stability in the area.⁶⁵ Initially Jordan was sought as a balance between Israel and other nations in the region. Jordan would provide stability in an inherently unstable region but could not do it on her own. The United Kingdom knew this and supported Transjordan; then the US took over the donor nation responsibilities and has supported Jordan ever since. Security assistance was the vehicle for this support.

Jordan used US security assistance when developing its foreign policy goals. These were as follows: defense of national independence against all perceived threats;

mobilization of external and internal resources for that defense; and utilization of whatever resources remain for economic and social development.⁶⁶

What has SA done to Jordan?

Jordan does not have an industry that produces large amounts of revenue. The nation has never been a moneymaker, more of a money taker. Jordan has no oil. Jordan is economically burdened by large numbers of refugees: 400,000 after 1948, 200,000 to 300,000 after 1967, and approximately 500,000 after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.⁶⁷ Potash and phosphates are the two main exports of Jordan. Another industry for Jordan is intellectual capital that consists of a large group of citizens that are of primarily Palestinian descent who worked outside of Jordan and sent remittances back to their families in Jordan. Jordan's non-support of the first Gulf War hurt them badly economically when Kuwait and other Gulf nations sent the Jordanian workers home as punishment.⁶⁸ The US, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia cut off payments to Jordan for their non-support as well.

The US kept the friendly government of Jordan in power by keeping the Army well equipped and trained.⁶⁹ The army is the key to Jordan's success and is more than just a defense force. It provides teachers in the small villages, labor to build roads, towns and other public works projects, and jobs for fifteen to 25 percent of the work age population.⁷⁰ Jordan is a constitutional monarchy and therefore not a democratic form of government. The US does not want a US style democracy in Jordan as this could lead to the removal of the Hashemites from the throne or significantly weaken their hold on power. The Hashemites do not want it as the Palestinians are in the majority and could possibly take over the government. The US wants a not too corrupt government that is

good to the people of the area and maintains the peace. The Jordanian Kings want to remain in power and will do what is necessary to maintain that power.

What does Jordan want from the US?

Military Support

Military support is crucial to keep the Hashemites in power and the military friendly, which is their true power base along with East Bank Jordanians. US assistance started in the 1940's and increased dramatically in the 1950's after the UK left and stopped providing support. The US began aid in 1957 and was the major supplier until 1967. Between 1967 and 1970 the US cut back aid due to Jordan's participation in the 1967 war but Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia stepped in to help. This changed in 1970 after Jordan removed the Palestinian fedayeen from Jordan; Kuwait and Libya stopped providing aid. Saudi Arabia continued and the US began providing aid again and remained the largest supplier from 1970 to the present.⁷¹ Modernizing the army and air force is necessary to maintain some measure of parity with other regional powers.

Keeping the small 600-man navy strong is important as it protects the vital port of Aqaba. Jordan must keep pace, or at least have parity, with its neighbors and for Jordan to maintain stability it must be militarily strong. Weakness invites attack either internally or externally. However, most of what Jordan wants for military equipment is for show rather than to fight.⁷² Jordan has not had a large scale armed conflict since June 1967. Jordan has fought three times since, but on a small scale, to include the Battle of Karama in March 1968,⁷³ the civil war in 1970-1971, and the engagement against Israelis in Syria during 1973.

What has Jordan asked for in the past?

Jordan has wanted expensive big-ticket items to include F16 fighters, AH-64 Apache helicopters, and M1 tanks. Part of this is a need to stay with the current technology and the rest is a need to keep up with other regional powers in the area. Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia all have these big-ticket items, or their Russian equivalents. Another aspect of this is the need to placate the military leadership. As Brooks notes, “maintaining the military’s loyalty is essential for retaining office in the Arab world’s authoritarian regimes.”⁷⁴ Jordan has also requested the basics including spare parts, ammunition, and training.

Economic Support

This has long been a priority of the Jordanian Kings. As the US Comptroller stated in 1973, “Jordan has never been economically self-sufficient.”⁷⁵ Jordan has relied on deficit spending and largesse from other nations to maintain her economy. Loan and debt reduction are important as a result of deficit spending and not having any high priced exports. The nation also has high unemployment (especially true among Palestinians living there). It is critical to keep the East Bank Jordanians financially stable as they are the second pillar to the Hashemites power base behind the army. However, it is interesting to note that the real moneymakers are businessmen of Palestinian descent. They are the ones who worked outside of Jordan and sent remittances back to their families until forced out of the Gulf nations in 1991.

Summary

This chapter covered Jordanian history from its beginnings up to the end of the Cold War. The roles of the Hashemite family, the army, and foreign powers were covered

as well. Israel and the Palestinians are two of the many factors impacting on Jordan. Chapters 2 and 3 laid the groundwork for chapter 4. The next chapter will begin the process of evaluating the US security assistance program with Jordan.

¹Beverley Milton-Edwards, and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001), xi.

²United States, Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, DOS-AID, Report # B-179001 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), 26.

³Ibid., 40.

⁴Madiha Rashid Al-Madfa, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 77.

⁵Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 34.

⁶Helen Chapin Metz, ed, *Jordan: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: USGPO 1991), 215; and Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 31.

⁷USAID, *US Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*, Web address: (<http://quesdb.cdie.org/gbk/>), accessed on 7 October 2004.

⁸Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 215.

⁹ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). *World Armaments and Disarmaments SIPRI Yearbook, various years (2004 and prior)*. <http://web.sipri.org/>. While some of this was actually delivered outside of the Cold War period, negotiations began during the Cold War.

¹⁰The peacekeeping operations were all post Cold War in timing and execution.

¹¹Appendix A provides a timeline of events within and externally to Jordan from 1916 to 2002.

¹²Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, xxi; and Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945*, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 3.

¹³David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon, 1989), 17.

¹⁴Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, *American National Security*, 5th ed. Baltimore (MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 406.

¹⁵Peace be upon him.

¹⁶Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 7.

¹⁷Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945*, 21.

¹⁸Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 66; and Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 5.

¹⁹Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 66.

²⁰Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, 7.

²¹Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 227.

²²Ibid.

²³Fromkin in *A Peace to End All Peace* provides a very good explanation of this process.

²⁴Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 111.

²⁵Peter Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Asian Historical Dictionaries, No. 4. (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991), 43.

²⁶Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 112.

²⁷Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 43.

²⁸Ibid., 36.

²⁹Ibid., 7-8; and Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, 77.

³⁰Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 43.

³¹Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East*, 513-514; and Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 20.

³²Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 20-22.

³³Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Pearson Education Inc., 2005), 178.

³⁴Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin. eds., *The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict*, 6th ed. (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001), 13-16.

³⁵Ibid., 16.

³⁶Ibid., 30-36.

³⁷Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, 76-78.

³⁸Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 233-234.

³⁹Adan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999), xv.

⁴⁰Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 12.

⁴¹Ibid., 8.

⁴²Ibid.; and Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 29.

⁴³Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 29-30.

⁴⁴Ibid., 30.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶This will be covered more in chapter 4.

⁴⁷Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 23.

⁴⁸Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 32.

⁴⁹Richard A. Gabriel, ed, *Fighting Armies: Antagonists in the Middle East – A Combat Assessment* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 28.

⁵⁰Orna Almog's *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958* provides an analysis of the era.

⁵¹Orna Almog, *Britain, Israel and the United States, 1955-1958: Beyond Suez* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 6.

⁵²These will be covered in more detail in chapter 4.

⁵³Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 43.

⁵⁴Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 9.

⁵⁵Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 81.

⁵⁶Ibid., 12.

⁵⁷Metz states the Palestinians are in the majority while other writers say it is more even. Many question the utility of this as the majority of what are called Palestinian refugees were actually born inside of Jordan.

⁵⁸Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 9.

⁵⁹Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 65-70.

⁶⁰Ibid., 85-86.

⁶¹Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: USGPO 1991), xxiii; and Lawrence Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2002), 8.

⁶²Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 65; and William Spencer, *Global Studies: The Middle East*, 9th ed. (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2003), 99. Both of these sources put the figure at or below 50%.

⁶³Author's note. Jordanians know their ancestors and make sure that others know as well. East Bank Jordanians are the "nobility" of Jordan. The Palestinians, outside the camps, are more educated and western oriented than East Bank Jordanians.

⁶⁴These will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.

⁶⁵US AID, *Congressional Budget Justification*, CBJ 2005 Jordan (www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ane/jo.html), 423.

⁶⁶Al-Madfa'i, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, 10.

⁶⁷Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 90.

⁶⁸Spencer, *Global Studies: The Middle East*, 100-101; and Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 30-35.

⁶⁹Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 41.

⁷⁰Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 53; and Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 41-42.

⁷¹Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 12-13.

⁷²Risa Brooks' *Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* provides a detailed analysis of this phenomenon in the Middle East and the implications of it.

⁷³Trevor N. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars: 1947-1974* (New York, NY: Harper Row, 1978), 351-356.

⁷⁴Risa Brooks, *Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi Paper 324, International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), 17.

⁷⁵Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 12.

CHAPTER 4

THE US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO JORDAN DURING THE COLD WAR

In accordance with the overall Middle East interests, the principal objective of US assistance programs to Jordan is to maintain a stable, moderate, and independent Arab government in Jordan. The current government under King Hussein is politically moderate and has a progressive attitude toward economic development of its own country and toward a peaceful settlement of its differences with Israel. King Hussein has indicated a number of times that a peaceful settlement would be in the best interests of all parties involved and has done more than any other Arab leader to encourage an honorable, just, and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹

United States, Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, 1973

Introduction

This chapter will measure the effectiveness of the US security assistance program with Jordan by melding the background from the first three chapters and US Government sources into an analysis of the program. This chapter begins with the role of presidential doctrine in Jordan. This will be followed by a discussion of the measures of effectiveness (MOE) laid out in chapter 1. The MOE will be discussed and analyzed here, which will lead to the conclusion in chapter 5 and the completion of the measures of effectiveness put forth in table 2 introduced in chapter 1.

Role of Presidential Doctrine in Jordan

US presidential doctrine has affected security assistance in Jordan. The Truman doctrine set the stage for security assistance and for support to Jordan. It was under Truman that initial economic support was provided to Jordan in 1951 (see appendix D² and table 4). As early as 17 April 1950 a US government objective was the political and

economic stability of Jordan. The stability of Jordan was of great importance to the security of the US.³ The Truman and Eisenhower administrations provided economic support to Jordan from 1951 to 1958 totaling almost sixty million dollars.

Table 4. Cold War Loans and Grants to Jordan

Program Name	Marshall Plan Period 1949-1952	Mutual Security Act Period 1953-1961	1962-1991	Total FAA Period 1962-1991	Total Loans and Grants 1949-1991
Economic Assistance Loans and Grants	5.2	275.6	1,666.9	1,666.9	1,947.7
Military Assistance Loans	0.0	0.0	879.3	879.3	879.3
Military Assistance Grants	0.0	21.2	957.1	957.1	978.3
Economic and Military Assistance Loans and Grants	5.2	296.8	3,503.3	3,503.3	3,805.3

Amounts in millions of dollars

Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (DISAM Greenbook); available from www.disam.dscamil; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2004.

By the end of the 1950s, Jordanian stability would be threatened. Internal Jordanian conflict, civil war in Lebanon, and the overthrow of the Hashemite rulers in Iraq were the catalyst for the implementation of the Eisenhower doctrine. The internal conflict was a result of anti-government violence after the British tried to induce Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955. This popular uprising was fanned by communists and nationalists who exploited perceived and actual outside influence in internal Jordanian affairs that threatened to topple the Hashemites. King Hussein reacted by removing General Glubb and the other British officers in the Arab Legion in 1956. This action helped diffuse the situation.⁴ The US recognized that the influence of the British was

almost non-existent and that Jordan would break the relationship with Britain. However, Jordan was not strong enough alone so the US stepped in and provided military support. For a while the tensions eased however, in 1958 Middle East tensions rose to an unacceptable level for the Eisenhower administration. The US regarded this situation, the overthrow of Iraq's ruling government, with alarm and invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine. While the US sent troops to Lebanon to stifle a possible civil war, Britain provided troops to Jordan at the request of Eisenhower to stabilize Jordan in case the Iraqi situation spread across the border. The US discussion about this event centered on the fact the US did not give support to Israel; therefore they should not give direct support to Jordan in order to appear neutral. So the British were requested to help for reasons of prestige.⁵ The crisis was eventually solved and the troops returned home.⁶

Officially US security assistance to Jordan got its start under President Eisenhower after the British stopped their support. US security assistance to Jordan began in 1957 with the first funds delivered in 1958. Jordan requested support in June 1957 asking for military assistance in the form of grants of funds, hardware, and training.⁷ On 24 January 1958 Eisenhower approved NSC 5801/1, the long range US policy towards the Middle East.⁸ The security assistance policy towards Jordan was stated in the following manner: "In order to maintain [the] present orientation of Jordan, . . . defense support and, to the extent required, to retain the loyalty of the army to the King, military assistance [is to be provided]. [The US should] Maintain support of [the] present regime in Jordan."⁹

While the Middle East was important, South East Asia and the Vietnam War was the primary, besides the Soviet Union, focus of Kennedy and Johnson. There was a

continuance of security assistance support to Jordan by the both administrations up to 1967 when the US cut off military grant assistance based on Jordan's role in the June, 1967 war against Israel. On 25 May 1961 President Kennedy sent a special message to Congress on urgent national needs regarding security assistance. He stated that the main burden must rest with local forces who must have the will and capacity to help themselves. The will had to come from within the nation, MAP (military assistance program) funds provided the capacity.¹⁰ The 1963 riots in Amman in response to the 17 April announcement by Egypt, Syria, and Iraq of the plan to merge and form another version of the United Arab Republic and intelligence of an Egyptian supported coup d'etat in Jordan led Kennedy to direct the movement of the US 6th Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean as a show of force in support of King Hussein.¹¹ This action helped to calm the situation and proved once again the US was willing to back King Hussein.

President Johnson sent a message to Congress on 14 January 1965 requesting economic aid to Jordan linking it to the maintenance of stability and security of the US.¹² Eventually, direct MAP aid to Jordan was cut during the Johnson administration due to the rising costs of the Vietnam War and Jordan's participation in the 1967 war against Israel.¹³ Military aid was cut from 1968 to 1970 as punishment for Jordan attacking Israel. However, IMET continued as did economic aid at reduced levels. Long term loans, extended for military assistance, were reestablished in February 1968 to help Jordan deal with the escalation of guerilla attacks in what eventually became the Civil War against the Palestinians.¹⁴

President Nixon restored security assistance in the form of military grant aid in 1971 following the civil war to help replace the equipment damaged and destroyed from

the 1967 war and the civil war. The restoration process between the US and Jordan had begun on 8 April 1969 when King Hussein visited the White House. President Nixon praised the King for his leadership of Jordan and spoke of the need for peace in the region. King Hussein replied that he wanted peace in the region although it would be difficult to attain.¹⁵ The Nixon administration, invoked the Nixon doctrine by providing both a show of force by moving the US 6th Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and direct military assistance to Jordan during the 1970-1971 civil war.¹⁶ The US significantly increased its economic aid as well.¹⁷ In February 1973 President Nixon assured King Hussein of his “firm . . . support for Jordan” promising increased economic and military aid.¹⁸ Nixon had refocused US foreign policy on the Middle East while disengaging from Vietnam and, with his doctrine, put the onus on the nation receiving the support to defend itself; US forces would be used as the last resort.

The Carter administration took on the most active role of any previous administration with the Middle East Peace Process that ended with the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. King Hussein did not want to participate due to the potential of becoming isolated from other Arab nations. In addition, Hussein worried about the potential for destabilization of Jordan’s Palestinian population. He did not want to represent Palestinian interests in negotiations unless he had a mandate to do so or had Palestinians in the bargaining process.¹⁹ Late in his term, President Carter developed his doctrine and tied US support to human rights. The doctrine focused on the Middle East with the Arab-Israeli peace and the Iranian crisis. The Carter Doctrine was a move to salvage a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It shifted away from a political to a military response, leading to the establishment of the US Rapid Deployment Joint Task

Force, which focused on the Middle East. King Hussein did not like the decision as he saw it as a repudiation of a peaceful political solution of the conflict. The US pressured Hussein to cooperate but he resisted.²⁰ This resistance cost Jordan as both military and economic grant aid were reduced, and in the case of military grant aid cut altogether from 1982 until 1987.

President Reagan redoubled the efforts to cultivate client states through arms sales and training programs throughout the region.²¹ He continued to provide economic assistance to Jordan and use Jordan as a solution for the Palestinian issue. President Reagan, continuing Nixon's approach, put the focus on the nation receiving the aid as the agent of change, not the US or US presence. He prioritized effort in the Middle East to include dispatching peacekeepers to Lebanon in 1982 to the re-flagging of oil tankers operating in the Persian Gulf in 1987 when the situation required. In 1985 President Reagan hosted King Hussein and discussed Jordan's commitment to Middle East peace and promised US support for both economic and security needs.²² Economic grant aid to Jordan peaked from 1985 to 1987 averaging one hundred million dollars a year.

In summary the US Cold War Presidents foreign policy views are as follows: Truman had a global, cold war, view of the world but focused on Europe until 1950 when the Korean War began. Eisenhower saw the US as a military force in the Middle East after 1956. Kennedy sought coexistence with the USSR and did not focus on the Middle East. Nixon and Reagan had a global view and saw issues in terms of USSR and the US. Johnson, Ford, and G. H. W. Bush occupied the mid-ground between Nixon and Carter. Carter was a regionalist and did not have a global view. This view caused problems during his time in office. Johnson and Reagan did not view the Middle East as a top

priority until a crisis occurred in 1967, and 1982 and 1987 respectively. Nixon, Ford, and Carter were all prepared to deal with the Middle East as a top priority. Johnson and Reagan were pro-Israel in their Middle East views and relegated Arab nations to the background. Nixon, Carter, and G. H. W. Bush were more even handed between Israel and Arab states when dealing with the Middle East.²³

US Political Process

The political process discussed in chapter 2 determines how programs or doctrine are developed and how much funding will be provided to a program. As seen with funding issues the carrot and stick approach to security assistance was applied to Jordan. This approach had some success. IMET was never removed from Jordan's funding package. The carrot and stick applied to military and economic grants and loans. The table at Appendix D and Table 4 includes the funding for Jordan during the Cold War. Overall, economic grant funding for Jordan during the Cold War maintained a fairly even and predictable level. Two downturns were in 1968 to 1970 and 1993 to 1995 as a result of the 1967 war and the failure to support the US led coalition that removed Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 respectively. As noted in chapter 3, Jordan's failure to support the US led coalition to oust Iraq from Kuwait resulted in aid to Jordan being reduced by seventy five percent.²⁴ Military grant funding followed a different path. It was cut after the 1967 war and there was no funding from 1982 to 1986 and again from 1989 to 1995. IMET continued throughout the Cold War. In hindsight, there does not appear to be any rational way to explain the funding levels and the changes for these funding levels other than the obvious ones for attacking Israel and non-support of US interests.²⁵

US Congressional politics, however, determines the funding levels and directly impact arms sales as these, based on dollar amounts, must be approved by Congress. This has not always worked in a favorable way for Jordan. For example, the sale of Hawk anti-aircraft missile systems in the 1980s was slowed down and changed from twenty-one mobile systems to fourteen fixed site systems because Israel did not want Jordan to have such a strong air defense capability. The projected air defense coverage of Jordan combined with Syria's coverage appeared to make Israel vulnerable and they objected to the US. Saudi Arabia paid for the systems but could not get the deal finalized in Jordan's favor.²⁶

The US Congress passed the Smith Amendment for the 1986 Foreign Aid Appropriation Bill. Section 403 stated that Congress would consider a Jordanian request for defense articles upon commencement of “direct” negotiations with Israel for peace and on the Palestinian issue.²⁷ The language of the bill was changed to say “directly” with Israel which implied that face to face negotiations were not required. This was agreeable to King Hussein and Jordan met these conditions. However, in October of 1985, Congress changed course and banned all arms sales unless Jordan entered into direct, face-to-face, negotiations with Israel.²⁸ As noted by a Jordanian lobbyist, US Congress made King Hussein jump through hoops; after he did this, Congress added a higher hoop to jump through.²⁹ This culminated after the first Gulf War of 1991 where the attitude of Congress worked against Jordan.³⁰

Measures of effective security assistance

The following section contains the discussion on the measures of effectiveness and the success or failure of US policy in each area. These lead to the completion of the table in chapter 5.

Refrain from attacking Israel

There were no issues between Transjordan and Palestine when the two were Mandate areas. The British ruled both and neither had territorial designs on the other. This all changed when Israel declared its independence on 15 May 1948. The combined Arab armies, consisting of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria attacked to destroy the fledgling nation. Israel held them off. After the fighting, Jordan occupied the West Bank and East Jerusalem and formerly annexed them in 1950.

Based on the 1948 war and Arab rhetoric, the US recognized in 1950 the importance of Jordan not attacking Israel. Noting that Jordan had the only efficient and highly trained Arab military force, shared occupation with Israel of Jerusalem, and a poor economy, the US realized that Jordan must be kept from fighting Israel.³¹ This was a largely successful policy except for 1967 and 1973.

Jordan did not participate in the 1956 war. The war was an Israeli-Egyptian conflict with France and Britain as co-belligerents with Israel. Jordan was, as described earlier, in the process of dealing with internal issues concerning the population and the loyalty of the Jordanian army. Nationalism was at fever pitch and King Hussein was asserting control over the Army and nation by removing the last vestiges of the British rule.

The 1958 coup in Iraq ousted the Iraqi branch of the Hashemites was devastating to King Hussein. He sensed the precariousness of his own position as the coup originated from within Iraq, and he requested short term military help as well as security assistance. The US provided both with British soldiers on the ground in Jordan and backed by US air support and US troops in Lebanon.

The 1967 war, as shown in chapter 3, was militarily and economically devastating to Jordan. The US added to this by stopping military grant aid for three years. However, IMET and economic grants continued although the level of economic aid decreased by fourteen million dollars. Military aid was begun again to support Jordan in their Civil War fight against the Palestinians.

The 1973 war was not harmful to Jordan as King Hussein showed restraint in not directly attacking Israel. US military grant funding had begun again in 1971 and maintained an average of over thirty-five million dollars a year until 1975 when it almost doubled. Transfers of excess US equipment were made as well as significant economic grant aid provided. Clearly, the financial rewards for not attacking Israel were significant and beneficial to Jordan.

Stop Fighting Israel In War

While Jordan fought in the 1948 war, it was the 1967 war that taught Jordan the lesson to leave Israel alone. They would not fight again with any consequence even though a brigade was sent to Syria to fight late in the 1973 war without effect. This was the last armed conflict between these two nations.

Stop Border Attacks

Border skirmishes plagued both Jordan and Israel throughout the Cold War. The main cause of these were Palestinians who crossed over the Jordanian border and carried out raids against Israeli settlements. Israel would then retaliate against Jordan. These never had a strategic implication for either side but the fighting did take a toll on the local populations. The one bright spot for Jordan was the 1968 battle of Karama when Jordan defeated a battalion sized Israeli incursion.³² The Civil War stopped the attacks as the more militant Palestinians were forcibly removed from Jordan.

Overall the US goal of Jordan not attacking Israel was accomplished. It took time for it to happen but the result was a generally peaceful border between the two nations. The US rewarded Jordan with security assistance for their compliance.

Promote Regime Stability and Maintain Leadership

Jordanian regime stability was important to the Middle East peace process. A peaceful Jordan allowed Israel to focus its security forces elsewhere. King Hussein needed a stable Jordan to remain in power and he spent a lot of time working this issue. As noted, the critical times for Jordan were 1956 to 1958, 1970 to 1971, and 1990 to 1991. The Palestinians had an effect on stability as they were a significant cause of friction throughout the Cold War not only in Jordan but in Lebanon and Israel as well.

The US wanted Jordan to be stable since the beginning of their relationship. The area was too volatile to not have Jordan politically stable. Overall, the US has kept pushing dollars towards Jordan for both economic and military support. However, the 1967 war fought by Jordan against Israel hurt Jordan financially as US military support stopped and economic support was reduced. Jordan became an almost neutral nation as it

works all sides of the actual and potential conflicts in the area. This policy hurt them in 1990 and beyond after King Hussein appeared to be siding with Iraq by remaining outside the coalition.

The US policy in 1947 towards the Middle East in general and Jordan in particular was to prevent great power ambition, rivalries, local discontents, and jealousies from developing into open conflict which might eventually lead to a third world war. It was US policy to take whatever measures may be proper to promote the political and economic development of the peoples of the Middle East.³³ The general policy of the US in the Middle East was to refrain from exporting arms to the region except to provide internal security. The only exception to this policy was countering Soviet aggression.³⁴

The policy towards Jordan in 1950 was focused on political and economic stability and that the US would provide advice and guidance to Jordan in their solution of these problems contingent upon Jordan's willingness to help themselves.³⁵ This policy served as a basis for SA; the US helps those who help themselves.

The US was concerned about the leadership of Jordan in 1951 after the assassination of King Abdullah. A number of US State Department civil servants discussed the future of Jordan on 24 July 1951 after the assassination. There was real concern about the future of Jordan as King Abdullah had held Jordan together. With the known mental problems of Talal and the age of Hussein, there was great concern about possible successors to the throne. Several alternatives were put forth: Jordan remains independent, Jordan combines with Iraq, or Jordan combines with Syria.³⁶ While Jordan remained independent, its future was in doubt.

The Hashemites and Jordanians survived the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951 and the abdication of King Talal in 1952 over his mental health issues. It is a tribute to the Jordanians, to the Hashemites, and to their power base that these transitions went as smoothly as they did from father to son. It is remarkable for that part of the world. SA provided the critical support to the throne throughout the Cold War.

On 4 November 1953 the Charge' de affairs, Mr. Lynch wrote to the State Department that Jordan was unhappy with the US and UN position on cutting off aid if Jordan was not working with Israel. Jordan could not be seen as supporting or helping Israel, as this would affect Jordan's life expectancy.³⁷

Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai stated on 22 August 1958 that Jordan was non-viable state, created originally by the British in their own national interest. As such it can only exist so long as subsidized by other states; the alternative is its dismemberment or absorption by another state.³⁸

This concern was echoed by US Embassy personnel in Jordan. Charge' Wright stated in 1958 that "Jordan as a non-viable state cannot long endure unless it reaches some accommodation with its Arab neighbors, all of whom are hostile in some manner."³⁹ These US concerns continued with the National Intelligence Estimate published on 10 March 1959. The US had "little confidence in Hussein's ability to hold his throne or, indeed, in the viability of Jordan as a state."⁴⁰

The US opinion of Jordan changed somewhat in 1961. A 26 May 1961 memo to President Kennedy from Mr. Feldman, a deputy special counsel, stated that Jordan was the key to stability in the area. The US would provide fifty to seventy million dollars a year of economic aid to support Jordan.⁴¹ Military aid averaged a little over three million

dollars a year. Economic aid was more important for Jordan than military aid at that time. A 13 September 1962 letter from President Kennedy to King Hussein stated that Jordan's stability and integrity were important to the free world.⁴²

This verbal and written support continued throughout the Cold War. The US backed up words with deeds that did not always develop in Jordan's favor. Future US aid, after 1967, would be measured against aid provided to Israel. Beginning in 1968, US relations with Israel could influence the amount of aid provided to Jordan.⁴³

Jordan made strides in Middle East stability in the 1970s and 1980s by its work in the Persian Gulf area. Jordan provided military advisors, instructors, engineers, skilled workers, and technical specialists to the newly independent Gulf countries.⁴⁴

King Hussein

King Hussein ruled Jordan for all but six years of the Cold War. He outlasted eight of the nine Cold War US Presidents.⁴⁵ His future seemed in doubt on three main occasions. He faced a series of crises between 1956 and 1958; his army was decisively defeated in 1967; and the Palestinians revolted between 1970 and 1971. Throughout all these crises he stayed in power. King Hussein was able to maneuver between the super power camps of the West and East. Although he focused westward to the UK and US, he was not above going to the Soviet Union for help. Regionally, he was able to remain above the Arab politics, except for 1967, and looked to others for help. From Cairo to Damascus to Riyadh and always with an eye towards Baghdad, he managed their nations and leaders for his own good. He never took his eye off of Israel throughout all of his years.⁴⁶ As noted in *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, "But whatever the importance of the 'western connection', the Hashemites are unchallenged as the rightful rulers of Jordan.

They are accepted as such by the vast majority of the Jordanian people and by the wider international community.”⁴⁷

This area is judged a success as well. The regime and leadership remained intact throughout the time period of the Cold War. This was attributable to US provided security assistance.

Keep Jordan in the US Camp

As already noted, King Hussein ruled Jordan during eight of the US Cold War President’s terms of office. William Quandt observes that King Hussein often seemed to despair that every few years he had to invest all over again in winning the trust of a new team in Washington.⁴⁸ This proved to the US administrations that Jordan wanted to remain in the US camp. However, it was a difficult job at times.

The US and the USSR viewed most other nations during the Cold War era as choosing sides. While neutrality in some regions was acceptable, no one was neutral in the Middle East. There was no middle ground. The Middle East did not divide up along two neat lines as Europe did; however, the tensions were there. Only Syria was supported by the USSR throughout the Cold War. Egypt received support up until the peace treaty with Israel in 1978. US forced Israel along with Britain and France to back out of Egypt in 1956. As early as 1956, the US realized that if it did not support Jordan, that nation would accept assistance from the Soviet Union.⁴⁹

President Eisenhower recognized the importance of Jordan and the Soviet Union’s possible inroads into the nation. He stated in a 21 May 1957 radio and television address to the American people on Mutual Security for Waging the Peace. “King Hussein has acted swiftly and resolutely to forestall disaster [communist infiltration and subversion]

and the peril now seems checked. Yet this victory would surely be lost without economic aid [and military aid] from outside Jordan.”⁵⁰ Eisenhower backed up this statement with MAP grant aid, IMET, and a transfer to excess US property in 1958. The US invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958 by landing soldiers in Lebanon and by requesting British support in Jordan and their placing of troops there to stabilize the country following the coup in Iraq. Economic aid increased as well (see Appendix D). After some years of wavering on what policy to follow, a 5 September 1959 dispatch from the US embassy in Jordan to the Department of State concerning the future of Jordan, the embassy stated there was no real alternative to a continuation of the maintenance of Jordan.⁵¹

While the US has assured Jordan of its support since the beginning of the SA program, there were times after 1967 when the concern for Israel overruled what the US could do for Jordan. Support dropped off after the 1967 war, the late 1970s during the peace talks, and also after the 1991 war in Iraq. Overall though, the US supported Jordan. The US was ready to support in 1970 and 1971 during the civil war with arms and soldiers if requested. US supported Jordan throughout the 1980s when Jordan provided support to Iraq.

Secretary of State George Shultz, testified before Congress, in the early 1980s, that economic and military assistance programs were needed to strengthen Jordan’s security and economy, both of which were vital to enable Jordan to confront the risks involved in playing a significant role in the Middle East.⁵²

While Jordan generally stayed in the US camp, it did go elsewhere when US policies worked against them. In 1978 Jordan requested F-16 fighters from the US. Congress denied the request so Jordan went to France for the Mirage F-1 fighters. Also in

1978 Jordan requested 300 M60A3 tanks. Congress said a deal could be completed if Jordan gave up the same number of M48 model tanks. Jordan declined and went to the United Kingdom for support.⁵³

During the late years of the Carter administration, 1979 to 1980, Jordan was denied assistance in retaliation for its refusal to participate in the Camp David accords. King Hussein felt he had no choice and went to the Soviet Union in 1981 to request air defense support. The Reagan administration worked to stop the arms deal but could not deliver based on Congressional actions.⁵⁴

Jordan generally sided with the US and continued to purchase equipment from the US throughout the Cold War. This did not happen all the time as Jordan bought from Britain and purchased equipment from the USSR and France when the US would not deliver equipment. However, the majority of equipment came from western sources and suppliers instead of the Soviet Union.

Keep Jordanian Military Strong

The army is the strength of the Hashemite throne.⁵⁵ The US, once it decided to support Jordan, knew it needed a strong Jordanian army. The US position was if the Jordanian army was to remain an effective fighting force, it should continue to consider the free world and specifically the US as its source of arms supply to maintain its strength.⁵⁶ As a result of US security assistance to Jordan, a US-Jordanian Joint Military Commission has functioned since 1974. Training exercises involving both the Jordanians and US occur on at least an annual basis.⁵⁷ These are not big exercises for the US. They are however, for Jordan; they become a prestige event as well as training tool to advance

the army's training. This bilateral initiative is an integral part of the security assistance program as it is focused on the military.

Jordan purchased much US equipment using SA provided funds during the Cold War. They would have purchased even more but as the examples above show, Congress and the Presidents did not allow them to complete all of the transactions. Jordan has received many gifts of aid as well. Some of these include excess defense articles (EDA) consisting of wheeled vehicles and other equipment no longer needed by the US military. This supports overall US interests as a stable Jordan helps to stabilize Israel. IMET has allowed many of the top officers to train at US institutions. Jordan sends at least one officer to the Army Command and General Staff College and Army War College each year. These officers go on to high rank within the Army. The military operates a mix of US and UK equipment; all provided through SA programs.

As King Hussein and Jordan were almost synonymous throughout the Cold War period, so to the Hashemites and the Jordanian military are almost synonymous as King Hussein and his sons and daughters as well served in the armed forces. A strong modern military keeps the East Bank Jordanians happy which translates into their support for the crown. While Jordan was considered the best trained Arab army, it has never been militarily strong enough to fight Israel and win. The successful seizure of the West Bank in 1948 was an anomaly, as Israel was fighting for its very life within its borders, as was shown in Jordan's defeat of 1967. From then on, Jordan learned the lesson of not fighting Israel. Throughout Jordan's history a close relationship, first with UK then with US was developed and maintained. Both nations supported the Jordanian kings throughout their tenure on the throne. The US wanted Jordan to have some kind of parity with Israel and

other Arab nations in military equipment but did not have the money to provide for this level of support. Therefore the US provides adequate amounts of equipment and funds to keep Jordan strong enough to defend itself against potential attackers.

The Nixon administration was prepared to provide military support, to include airborne soldiers, aircraft to fly hostages out of Jordan, from the three hijacked aircraft landed in Jordan, and the US 6th fleet moving to the eastern Mediterranean, to Jordan in the September 1970 Civil War. King Hussein's survival was essential to the American peace settlement effort. Ultimately this did not happen but the US was ready to act.⁵⁸

President Carter understood the importance of Jordan's military and used the US security assistance support to coerce Jordan into cooperation and changing its attitude toward the Arab-Israeli peace treaty. This was only marginally successful as King Hussein knew he only had to outlast Carter before his fortunes might change.

On 27 September 1985 President Reagan notified Congress of his intention to provide tools for Jordanian self-defense. He did this to support King Hussein's desire for Middle East peace and to provide needed support to Jordan while working to bring about this peace process.⁵⁹

Jordan has long been recognized as having the best Arab army and continues in that tradition. US security assistance was vital for this tradition. However, credit must be given to the Jordanians themselves for their professionalism and dedication. Jordan's army was good enough to export its knowledge to other Arab nations. Two examples were military advisors sent to Kuwait in the 1960s and to Oman in the 1970s.⁶⁰

Sign a Peace Treaty with Israel

As noted briefly in chapter 3, US support for Israel is the one constant of US foreign policy since the 1960's. Jordan has had to work under this constraint. For years the US has told Jordan not to attack Israel and to sign a peace treaty; by not attacking and signing the peace treaty, Jordan could reap substantial financial rewards. However, Jordan has had to balance Israel and the Palestinians with the views of the rest of the Arab nations who all want Israel permanently removed from the world stage. Jordan was threatened with expulsion from the Arab League in 1950 if it signed a peace agreement with Israel.⁶¹ President Carter was the first to pursue a peace treaty in earnest. Jordan had been at peace, or at least not at war, with Israel dating back to 1973 and has had better relations with Israel than any other Middle East nation. Carter attempted to get Jordan involved in the peace talks but King Hussein would not comply. King Hussein, as was examined in more detail in chapter 3, had to weigh many factors before deciding an issue: Jordan's standing in the Middle East with other Middle East nations; Jordan's relations with Israel; The Kingdom's Palestinian population; and Jordan's relation with the US and to a lesser degree the UK.⁶² The time was not right in 1978. The primary reason was the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. King Hussein felt they were not being properly looked after in the accords and he was not able or allowed to articulate a policy.⁶³ President Reagan tried to get the MEPP going but failed as well.

King Hussein felt that he could not and should not negotiate with Israel without the Palestinians at the table or at least have a mandate from them allowing him to do so. The US, especially President's Carter and Reagan tried to force him to do this. The King

refused and it cost him financially. However, it worked to his advantage amongst his own population and that of the Palestinians.⁶⁴

While the US Presidents were the major foreign policy drivers during the Cold War, Congress also had much to say in what nations got what amount of support. This, as has been mentioned, hurt Jordan on many occasions. Israel was the priority after 1967 for US support and Jordan, as the neighbor with the longest border, and its unwillingness to sign a peace treaty suffered. The Palestinians also played a part as the presidential administrations and Congress tried to force Jordan into negotiating without Palestinian representation on a peace treaty with Israel.⁶⁵

This measure failed. Ultimately Jordan did not comply with the US objective to sign a peace treaty with Israel during the Cold War. While, there was no *de jure* peace, there was a *de facto* peace from the early 1970s to the present.

Promote Democracy and Regime Liberalization

Jordan's parliament consisted of two houses. The lower, directly elected, house is termed the Chamber of Deputies. The upper house, the Senate, is appointed by the King. King Hussein used his parliament as a tool to keep the population under control. The parliament elected in 1967 sat until dissolved in 1974. It was recalled in 1976 but dismissed later that same year. Parliament was recalled again in 1984 and elections were held in 1986. King Hussein dissolved it again in 1988. Elections were held again in 1989.⁶⁶ In 1978 he formed a council, without authority, that he would consult on matters of state. These measures were used to not only keep his own people ordered but could be manipulated to show outsiders that some form of democracy was being allowed to flourish in Jordan when it was politically expedient.⁶⁷

The US has used SA to influence nations to become more democratic. This policy did not gain momentum until the Carter presidency in the late 1970's. While the US pushed democracy, Jordan did not wholeheartedly embrace the concept. As has been noted throughout this thesis, the region's instability and the Palestinian issues all worked against democratic movements. Jordanian democracy necessarily was to be sacrificed on the altar of regime stability and survival.⁶⁸ King Hussein went through a number of periods of loosening and then tightening controls on the press and free speech. The cycles of democratic movements in Jordan began in the early 1950s to 1956. This ended with the attempted coup and unrest throughout the rest of the decade. After the UAR dissolved in 1961, Jordan could focus on democracy with the caveat that it could stop at any time.⁶⁹ It stopped in 1967 and did not start again until 1989. In 1989 the US as the major aid donor to Jordan forced King Hussein to loosen his grip on the state.⁷⁰ Throughout King Hussein sought regime survival. As the times changed he could relax or lighten the state power but never to the extent of regime destruction. Jordan had to keep the Palestinian population under control. The royal family's concern was that to let the people turn the country into a democracy would eliminate the Hashemites as the ruling power.

Regime liberalization has gone in the same cycles as the move towards democracy. Everything had to be weighed against regime survival. Freedom of the press was one of the first rights to go when the government cracked down. Dissent is tolerated somewhat but not to the extent tolerated here in the US.

This measure was not accomplished during the Cold War and may never be as long as the Hashemites remain on the throne. Some liberalization and more representative government can be accomplished but not at the cost of power to the Hashemites.

Summary

This chapter covered both presidential doctrine and the measures of effectiveness, evaluated them both, and provided some conclusions in relation to the US security assistance program to Jordan. The next step will be to expand on the conclusions presented here and complete the table first discussed in chapter 1.

¹United States, Comptroller, *Summary of US Assistance to Jordan*, DOS-AID, Report # B-179001 (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1973), 27.

²All funding figures are shown in Appendix D of this thesis.

³United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 5, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1978), Policy of the US with regard to Jordan, 1094.

⁴United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 13, *Near East: Jordan-Yemen* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1988), 37.

⁵United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. 11, *Lebanon and Jordan* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1992), 17 January 1958, 264-267.

⁶Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), 96.

⁷Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 13, *Near East: Jordan-Yemen*, from a 7 June 1957 memorandum, 134.

⁸The US places the Middle East in the realm of the Near East in the policy directorates of the State Department.

⁹Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. 11, *Lebanon and Jordan*, 24 January 1958, 268.

¹⁰United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO), Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1961-, John F. Kennedy, 1962, 396-406.

¹¹Lawrence Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2002), 93-95.

¹²United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO), Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1965-, vol. 1 and 2, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, 45.

¹³The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY 2005 Request* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2004). Internet: www.hfienberg.com/kesher/mideast.htm, Accessed 4 March 2005, 5.

¹⁴Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Jordan: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: USGPO 1991), 38-39.

¹⁵United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO), Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1969-, Richard M. Nixon, 1971, 267-268.

¹⁶Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 42.

¹⁷Congressional Research Service, *US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY 2005 Request*, 6.

¹⁸Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 45.

¹⁹Ibid., 52-53.

²⁰Madiha Rashid Al-Madfa'i, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 63-65.

²¹A. J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005), 192.

²²United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Office of the *Federal Register*, National Achieves and Records Service, 1985-. Ronald W. Reagan, 1988, 29 May 1985, 683-686.

²³William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 387-388.

²⁴Congressional Research Service, *US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends, and the FY 2005 Request*, 6.

²⁵This situation remained unchanged in the 1990s during the author's tour in Jordan.

²⁶Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 262.

²⁷Al-Madfa, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, 77.

²⁸Ibid., 78.

²⁹Ibid. 78.

³⁰Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 261-263.

³¹Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 5, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Policy of the US with regard to Jordan, 1095.

³²This is a proud day of celebration for the Jordan Armed Forces and was still celebrated while the author was assigned to Jordan.

³³United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. 5, *The Near East and Africa*, American position background from “The British and American Position” (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971), 513.

³⁴Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947*, vol. 5, *The Near East and Africa*, Arms policy of US, 527.

³⁵Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 5, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, 1094.

³⁶Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951*, vol. 5, *The Near East and Africa*, 85-89.

³⁷United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, vol. 9, *The Near and Middle East* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 1986), 1404.

³⁸Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. 11, *Lebanon and Jordan*, from telegram US Embassy in Jordan to Department of State, by Wright, 514.

³⁹Ibid., Letter from Charge’ Wright to Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Rockwell), 10 October 1958, 603.

⁴⁰Ibid., National Intelligence Estimate, 10 March 1959, 681.

⁴¹United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. 17, *Near East: 1961-1962* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1994), 132.

⁴²United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. 18, *Near East: 1962-1963* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 1995), 62-63.

⁴³Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 47.

⁴⁴The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Jordan: US Relations and Bilateral Issues* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2002), Internet, www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/IB93085.pdf, accessed 28 February 2005, CRS-1.

⁴⁵Only President Truman, the first Cold War president, who served prior to King Hussein's ascension to the throne.

⁴⁶Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 6.

⁴⁷Ibid., 118.

⁴⁸Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 387.

⁴⁹Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 13, *Near East: Jordan-Yemen*, from a 26 November 1956 memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Near East to the acting Secretary of State, 68.

⁵⁰United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1957-, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, 91.

⁵¹Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960*, vol. 11, *Lebanon and Jordan*, 720.

⁵²Al-Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, 77.

⁵³Ibid., 79-80.

⁵⁴Ibid., 80-81.

⁵⁵Risa Brooks, *Political Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi Paper 324, International Institute for Strategic Studies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press 1998), Introduction.

⁵⁶Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, vol. 13, *Near East: Jordan-Yemen*, from a 7 June 1957 memorandum, 135.

⁵⁷The Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Jordan: US Relations and Bilateral Issues* (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2002), Internet,

www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/IB93085.pdf, accessed 28 February 2005, CRS-14.

⁵⁸Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967*, 79.

⁵⁹United States President, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States* (Washington, DC: USGPO) Office of the *Federal Register*, National Archives and Records Service, 1985-. Ronald W. Reagan, 1988, 29 May 1985, 1147-1148.

⁶⁰Al-Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, 83.

⁶¹Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950*, vol. 5, *The Near East, South Asia, and Africa*, Policy of the US with regard to Jordan, 1099.

⁶²Metz, *Jordan: A Country Study*, 52.

⁶³Lukacs, Madfai, and the two books by Milton-Edwards cover this area.

⁶⁴Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 1998), 258-262.

⁶⁵Al-Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process, 1974-1991*, 108.

⁶⁶Peter Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Asian Historical Dictionaries, No. 4. (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991), 70.

⁶⁷Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan*, 264.

⁶⁸Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 42.

⁶⁹Lawrence Tal, *Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 1955-1967* (New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan, 2002), 85.

⁷⁰Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 58.

CHAPTER 5

MEASURED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE US SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO JORDAN DURING THE COLD WAR

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 forced a paradigm shift in our thinking about US National Security. Before September 11, we tended to conceive of ourselves as a nation with global interests that could be protected via engagement abroad, but whose homeland was relatively insulated from chaos and conflict overseas. After September 11, we know we are not invulnerable. Wars will be brought home to US in unexpected and horrific ways.¹

Kurt M. Campbell and Miche'le Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism*, 2001

Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace – a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.²

The White House, *National Security Strategy of the USA*, 2002

Introduction

The first four chapters of this thesis discussed security assistance in general, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the effectiveness of the SA program with Jordan during the Cold War. Here in chapter 5 the measures of effectiveness matrix will be completed and the determination made if the program was, in general, effective. This will be followed by the conclusion. An epilogue that follows that will briefly discuss US policy towards Jordan in the post Cold War environment, current levels of security assistance to Jordan, and some thoughts on the future of the US-Jordan security assistance program. Potential focus areas for future studies will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Was the US Security Assistance program with Jordan effective?

The US security assistance program to Jordan was effective for the US. Jordan existed as a nation state at the end of the Cold War and while it was involved in armed conflict with Israel on three occasions, Israel survived the attacks and in fact, the damage inflicted to Israel was not as significant as the damage inflicted on Jordan. Jordan remained relatively stable throughout the time period and the Hashemites remained on the throne, accomplishing two transitions of power, an assassination and an abdication of the throne. The Jordanian military remained strong and the best trained of all the Arab armies. Jordan remained in the US camp although there were times when it strayed to other nations based on the US not meeting the needs of Jordan. While democracy and liberalization of the regime was tried at times, these two never advanced as far as they could based on the situation. The major failure of the whole program was Jordan's failure to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel.

Completed table

The following is a review of how the table was completed. The measures of effectiveness were evaluated during the terms of the Cold War presidents, except President's Ford and G. H. W. Bush based on their lack of an identifiable doctrine. The ratings are for the entire period of their term in office. If an event occurred during the term, the rating is yes. If it does not occur then the rating will be no. If the event occurred and then changed back, specifically under the two topics of stability and democracy, then the section was be rated both yes/no. The assessments combine objective and subjective evaluations.

Table 5. Completed Measures of Effectiveness

Refrain from attacking Israel	YES	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	NO
Promote Regime Stability and Maintain Leadership	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Keep Jordan in US camp	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Keep Military Strong	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Sign a Peace Treaty with Israel	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Promote Democracy and Regime Liberalization	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES/NO	YES/NO
	Truman	Eisenhower	Kennedy	Johnson	Nixon	Carter	Reagan

Explanation of table

This table shows the results of the US security assistance program with Jordan during the Cold War based on the measures of effectiveness set out in chapter 1 of this thesis. While some of these categories are straight forward: attacking Israel, keeping the military strong, and signing a peace treaty with Israel, others are not so easy to depict. Regime stability and maintaining leadership are, on the surface, clear cut. But while the Hashemites maintained the throne, their stability and that of Jordan as a whole was in question on at least three occasions. The 1956 to 1958 crisis, the 1967 war and the 1970 to 1971 Civil War all called into question the ability of the Hashemites to endure and keep the throne. Ultimately they did survive and became stronger for it but there were some tense moments. The US intervened in the 1958 crisis, provided support in the post

1967 rearming of the military and was ready to provide support during the civil war.

Security assistance was the vehicle for this support during these crises.

Did the program meet US Goals and Objectives?

Overall the program met the goals and objectives set out by the US government.

The following topics will be discussed in detail.

Refrain from attacking Israel: Jordan fought Israel on three occasions, excluding border clashes, during the Cold War. Jordan suffered more damage to itself than it inflicted on Israel in 1967. The other wars in 1948 and 1973 were not as significant to Jordan or Israel. Overall, Jordan was never a unilateral threat to Israel. Only when Jordan allied itself militarily with Egypt and Syria in 1967, did Israel take note and action. This section alone does not indicate an effective security assistance program: the US told Jordan not to attack Israel and Jordan did on three different occasions. However, when the other measures of effectiveness are included, the overall program was effective. The US and Israel realized that Jordan was not serious a threat. Some conflict was inevitable, and from Jordan's perspective, expected. Funding was decremented, but not cut off, because of the attacks.

Promote Regime Stability and Maintain Leadership: While the stability of the Hashemite regime was in question on at least three occasions, the leadership continued throughout the Cold War. This is attributable to both the UK and US support of Jordan, the support structure of the Hashemite dynasty, and to the political acumen of King Hussein.

Keep Jordan in US camp: Jordan stayed in the US camp throughout this period. Even during the early Cold War when Britain was the prime benefactor of Jordan, it

aligned itself with the West. There were a couple of periods when Jordan went to the Soviet Union, but this was only in response to the US not providing the security assistance King Hussein thought he should receive. This was not ideological, just arms business.

Keep Military Strong: Jordan's military remained strong and effective, except for the 1967 war, throughout the Cold War era. The Jordanian army, under British leadership, was recognized as the best Arab army. The tradition continued during the US security assistance period. While not seriously tested in battle, except for 1967 and certain units during the civil war, its tradition of professionalism and quality continued. US assistance is the reason for its ability and claim to be considered the best Arab army at the end of the Cold War.

Sign a Peace Treaty with Israel: Jordan did not sign a peace treaty with Israel. It was not for a lack of opportunities as the US worked to get the two nations together during the late 1970s and 1980s. However, the conditions in the view of King Hussein were not appropriate for this to occur. The main stumbling block was the Palestinians. Even without a *de jure* treaty, Jordan and Israel had a *de facto* peace since 1973.

Promote Democracy and Regime Liberalization: This section was the most difficult to measure. Elections and an elected parliament are criteria. Regime survival took precedent over this area and when not threatened, the Hashemites allowed elections and allowed a sitting parliament. In times of troubles, both were suspended until the crisis passed and the King felt he could relax the pressure on the population. As noted earlier in the thesis, this is of lesser importance for the US, based on the implication of the

Hashemites potentially losing their power. The US needed the Hashemites in control of Jordan.

Overall, Jordan fulfilled the US goals of the security assistance program. Jordan proved to be a friend or at least a cold enemy to Israel throughout the Cold War. They both realized their need for each other. The Hashemites stayed in power during the Cold War based on US security assistance support.

Additionally, and while not part of the stated thesis and research questions, the US security assistance program met the objectives of Jordan during the Cold War. It helped the Hashemites remain in power and Jordan to remain stable, which worked to keep the rest of the Middle East stable. Jordan kept its position within the Middle East community as a stable and committed friend to the Arab nations while balancing relations with Israel and Jordan's western benefactors. Jordan has also worked hard to become a member of the wider world community and security assistance enabled them to do this.

What is the result of the program?

The US achieved its goals of stability and regime survival for very little cost. Despite all the issues on either side, the money never stopped flowing from the US to Jordan since it started in 1951. The amounts and categories of support changed due to the prevailing political climate but it never ceased. Table 5 shows the consolidated amounts of US assistance to Jordan during the Cold War.

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to measure the effectiveness of the US security assistance program to Jordan during the Cold War. As shown in chapter 4 and concluded in chapter 5, the security assistance program was effective.

While Jordan was valuable to the US by itself, it was not critical. Only when Jordan is viewed through the lens of Israel and the greater Middle East does it become critical. The US recognized this fact and supported Jordan as appropriate. US support to Jordan was both valuable and critical to Jordan's survival. Without it, the Hashemites and Jordan itself may not have survived the Cold War. While other nations provided support to Jordan throughout the Cold War, only the US had the resources to provide the level of support that Jordan required. However, all support comes with some kind of qualification attached and US as well as Arab support hinged on Jordan conforming to the donor nation expectations.

The Hashemite kingdom continues to reside in the middle of the most volatile region of the world.³ Jordan relied on US assistance to maintain its position within the Middle East. The US relied on Jordan to provide stability. Jordan will continue to play an important supporting role on the world stage. How the US and its allies develop Jordan will be critical.

Epilogue

This section will cover the US-Jordanian relationship since the end of the Cold War. The relationship continues to this day and has become more critical to both nations during the current war on terror.⁴ The topics covered will include Jordan since 1991, current security assistance to Jordan, and the future of security assistance and some of the advantages and disadvantages of security assistance. The thesis will end with a section on focus of future studies or inquiry.

Security assistance is an on-going and important concern for the US. There is a need to define, clarify, and gauge the effectiveness of US policy for security assistance

followed by the needs and wants of the nation receiving security assistance. An overall coherent US policy in the Middle East is needed. The US de facto supports Israel at the expense of other Middle East nations while de jure supports all under the rubric of the Middle East Peace Process. The need for Middle East oil underlies all of the above issues.

Jordan since 1991

Peace Treaty with Israel

After much work by Cold War presidential administrations, the first post Cold War administration accomplished the number one goal of the US with respect to Jordan. The Clinton administration brokered a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in July 1994 and it was signed on 23 October 1994.⁵ The 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel removed the eastern threat and allowed Israel to focus its security efforts principally to the following two areas: internally to stop the suicide bombings and Palestinian unrest and externally towards Lebanon and Syria. Jordan signed the peace treaty based in part on US debt forgiveness,⁶ keeping Jordan financially afloat. Jordan's treaty with Israel earned it more money and prestige in the US view but not, initially, the amount King Hussein thought he would receive and the timing of that assistance.⁷ The main reason for this was a lack of congressional support for an increase in funding coming so soon after the Jordanian non-support of the US led coalition to oust the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. The US Congress would hold this against him for the coming years.⁸ The program for the author's first year in the Embassy in fiscal year 1996 was just 7.2 million dollars. It went up the following years significantly. The

financial impact for Jordan was a substantial increase in SA although it was delayed in delivery until 1996 and then again starting in 1999.

Jordan received the following additional security assistance as part of the brokered deal for signing the peace treaty:

1. In 1996 Jordan received over 1000 tactical trucks as part of the US Army's Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program.⁹

2. Jordan received a total of 88 M60A3 tanks (50 in 1996 and another 38 in 1998) as part of a large drawdown of US equipment. Included in this drawdown were 250 tactical trucks, 18 UH-1 Huey helicopters, and a C-130 cargo plane.¹⁰

3. Jordan received a squadron of 16 F-16 fighters in 1997.¹¹

In addition to the materiel gains, the US designated Jordan a major non-NATO ally on 13 November 1996. Other allies include: Australia, Argentina, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, New Zealand, Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand. While this designation is largely symbolic and carried no automatic monetary rewards, it did help with Jordan's prestige, standing in the Middle East, and signaled a term of better relations with US Congress. The granting of this status also allows Jordan the priority delivery of excess defense articles, stockpiling of US defense articles, and participation in the Defense Export Loan Guarantee program.¹²

Death of King Hussein and transfer of power to King Abdullah II

King Hussein died after a long fight with cancer in January 1999. Just prior to his death he transferred the role of Crown Prince from his younger brother, Hassan, who had held it for over thirty years, to his oldest son Abdullah. Abdullah became king upon the death of his father and in the last six years has continued to lead Jordan in the ways of his

father as a western oriented, forward looking Middle East nation. This transition further cements the Hashemites as the rulers of Jordan.¹³

Jordanian Military Actions Since 1991

The Jordanian army continues to develop. The Jordanian army, primarily the Special Forces, fought a series of small battles on their border with Iraq throughout the 1990s against bands of smugglers.¹⁴ Jordan participated in many peacekeeping operations, especially in the former Yugoslavia area. From 1997 to 2002 Jordan supplied soldiers to fifty-three different peacekeeping operations.¹⁵ Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US, Jordan has contributed support soldiers to the US led war in Afghanistan and has supported temporary basing of US soldiers for the war in Iraq.¹⁶ Jordan continues to be viewed as having one of the best, if not the best, Arab army. It carries out more realistic training in combined and maneuver warfare than any of its Arab neighbors.¹⁷

Current Security Assistance

Currently, the military program for Jordan is focused on FMF and IMET. Economic support funds (ESF) are an additional part of the overall security assistance program and have provided over half of all funds to Jordan.¹⁸ Currently Jordan receives 250 million dollars a year in ESF.¹⁹ IMET equals 2.4 million dollars²⁰ and FMF equals 198 million dollars.²¹ These are significant funds.

Table 6 shows the post-Cold War funding for Jordan. Note that the funding during the last fifteen years is more than what Jordan received during the first fifty years of the security assistance program. As long as Jordan continues to support the US and the US

sees Jordan as important for reasons already mentioned, the support at these levels will continue.

Table 6. Post-Cold War Loans and Grants to Jordan

Program Name	Economic Assistance Loans and Grants	Military Assistance Loans	Military Assistance Grants	Economic and Military Assistance Loans and Grants
1991-2004	2,661.7	29.5	1,380.3	4,062.5

Amounts in millions of dollars

Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants (DISAM Greenbook) available from www.disam.dsca.mil; Internet; accessed on 15 September 2004.

Future for US-Jordan Relations

The US and Jordan will continue to maintain good relations. The security of Israel demands it as does the war on terror.

Will the US continue to support Jordan?

Jordan is still important and still recognized as a stable environment and factor in the Middle East. As long as Iraq continues to remain unsettled, Jordan will be important, both for stability on the west frontier and also to continue to act as a buffer to Israel. Jordan does rank third in aid received behind Israel and Egypt. This standing is expected to remain steady.

What is the future of Security Assistance?

There continue to be discussions about scaling back security assistance. Numerous authors have put forth the ideas and plans to revamp the security assistance program. These include the pre-11 September 2001 *Send Guns and Money: United States*

Security Assistance and Foreign Policy and three post-11 September 2001 books: *To Prevail, Challenging Conventional Wisdom, and The New American Militarism.*

However, no change has occurred.

While the overall amount of money in fiscal year 2004 security assistance is relatively small at 4.6 billion dollars²² in relation to the 2004 Defense Budget of 399 billion dollars²³ and to the total US budget of 2,243 billion dollars²⁴ the impact is large and worldwide. The US provided SA to ninety-six nations and thirty-one regional organizations in fiscal year 2004²⁵. The money will continue to flow with the ongoing operations concerning the war on terror.

Focus of Future Studies

With the end of the Cold War and now with the-US led war on terror, called by some authors World War III and World War IV,²⁶ respectively, there is still a need to continue to study the effects of US policy during the Cold War. Further studies of the results of security assistance in the region are necessary. There is still much to be written on Jordan and the US support provided during and after the Cold War. US government papers need to be further mined, as they become de-classified though time or the Freedom of Information Act, to understand the basis and implications of US policy as well as further regional impacts. Areas for study include security assistance to Jordan after the Cold War; how security assistance can and is used against the US by either the receiving nation or third parties; and how security assistance has potentially changed the Middle East. While Israel has volumes written about it, security assistance, and its relationship to the US and the Middle East, there is little about the Palestinians and how security assistance has been used by the US to both Israel and Jordan to keep the

Palestinians under control. Another area is the impact of security assistance during the current war on terror and how each affect the other.

¹Kurt M. Campbell and Miche'le Flournoy, *To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign Against Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2001), 65.

²The White House, *National Security Strategy of the USA* (Washington, DC: US GPO, 2002), 1.

³US AID, *Congressional Budget Justification*, CBJ 2005 Jordan, accessed 13 December 2004, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ane/jo.html, 422. Internet.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, *American Foreign Relations: A History Since 1895*, 5th ed. vol. 2. (New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000), 493.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Beverley Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 109, 112-113.

⁸The Jordanians were still dealing with the after effects of their decision during my tour from 1995 to 1997.

⁹This equipment was delivered to Jordan while the author was assigned to the Embassy. The author accompanied a team of Jordanians to Germany of January 1996 to select the EDA trucks and saw the delivery of those trucks in the summer of 1996.

¹⁰The author was the project officer for the Drawdown equipment (tanks and helicopters) in December of 1996.

¹¹The author supported the US Air Force element with this delivery.

¹²Center for International Policy, at <http://www.ciponline.org/facts/mnna.htm> accessed 10 May 2005.

¹³Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, 117-119.

¹⁴Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 191.

¹⁵SIPRI at <http://first.sipri.org> accessed 24 January 2005.

¹⁶Tommy Franks, *American Soldier* (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2004), 248, 352, 404-406, 433.

¹⁷Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East*, 193.

¹⁸USAID, *Congressional Budget Justification*, CBJ 2005 Jordan, 422; accessed 13 December 2004, available from www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ane/jo.html; Internet.

¹⁹USAID FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request, accessed 13 December 2004, available from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/asia_near_east/Jordan.pdf; Internet.

²⁰Kenneth W. Martin, *FY 2003 Security Assistance Legislation and Funding Allocations*, DISAM Journal, Spring 2003 (Wright-Patterson AFB: USGPO 2003), 33.

²¹Martin, *FY 2003 Security Assistance Legislation and Funding Allocations*, 28.

²²USAID FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request, accessed 13 December 2004, available from http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/summary_tables_table1.pdf, Internet.

²³Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), *National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2004*, (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2003), http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2004/fy2004_greenbook.pdf, accessed 13 December 2004, table 1-1.

²⁴Ibid., table 1-7.

²⁵USAID FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request, accessed at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2004/summary_tables_table4.pdf, accessed 13 December 2004.

²⁶A. J. Bacevich and Norman Podhoretz are among those that refer to these eras as World War III and World War IV.

GLOSSARY

Balfour Declaration. Great Britain declaring “sympathy” for a Jewish homeland in Palestine signed 2 November 1917.

Baghdad Pact. Britain, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey joined in a mutual defense treaty in 1955 with the goals of containing the Soviet Union and communism.¹

Carter Doctrine. An attempt by any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

Direct Commercial Sales. A sale made by a US industry directly to a foreign buyer.²

Economic Support Fund. This fund was established to promote economic and political stability in areas where the United States has special political and security interests and where the U.S. has determined that economic assistance can be useful in helping to secure peace or to avert major economic or political crises. ESF is a flexible economic instrument which is made available on a grant basis for a variety of economic purposes, including balance of payments support, infrastructure, and other capital and technical assistance development projects.³

Eisenhower Doctrine. Non-communist governments must receive aide and support from the US, because otherwise they are in danger of falling under Soviet influences.

Emergency Drawdowns. During a crisis, the FAA authorizes the President to provide USG articles, services, and training to friendly countries and international organizations at no cost, to include free transportation.

Excess Defense Articles. President is authorized to sell defense articles (via the FMS process) declared excess by the Military Departments or Defense Agency to be in excess of requirements.

Foreign Military Financing Program. Consists of Congressionally appropriated grants and loans which enable eligible foreign governments to purchase US defense articles, services, and training through either FMS or direct commercial sales channels.⁴

Foreign Military Sales. That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred.⁵

Foreign Policy. A foreign policy doctrine is a general statement of foreign policy. In some cases, the statement is made by a political leader, typically a nation's chief executive or chief diplomat, and comes to be named after that leader. The purpose of a foreign policy doctrine is to provide general rules for the conduct of foreign policy. These rules allow the political leadership of a nation to deal with a situation and to explain the actions of a nation to other nations.

Global War on Terror. US led coalition declaring and fighting a war on all those who seek to export terror and a war against governments who shelter them. US will make no distinction between terrorists and those persons, organizations, or governments who aid or harbor them. Will use the following to fight the war and accomplish the mission: Diplomacy, Military, Law Enforcement, Humanitarian, Homeland Security, and Financial Institutions. Success will come by acting with a coalition of partners willing to fight terrorism of global reach simultaneously in the domestic, regional, and global contexts.⁶

International Military Education and Training. Provides training in the US and, in some cases, in overseas US military facilities to selected foreign military and related civilian personnel on a grant basis.⁷

Johnson Doctrine. U.S. will intervene in the Western Hemisphere to prevent a communist threat to any government.

Jordanian. Jordan nationals irrespective of their origin.⁸

Kennedy Doctrine. The United States will oppose the formation of any Latin-American communist government.

Mandate. System of administration authorized by the League of Nations and former German colonies and Asian parts of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. Intended for the tutelage by the more advanced nations of peoples considered unready for independence. In the Middle East Britain was awarded the mandates for Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq; France for Syria and Lebanon.⁹

Nixon Doctrine. When direct US military presence is not possible, the US shall train and assist native rebels in the country of the conflict.

Palestinians. The Arab people of Mandate Palestine.¹⁰

Palestinian Jordanian. Palestinians who became Jordanian nationals after the unity of West and East Bank in 1950.¹¹

Peacekeeping Operations. Money provided to specific peacekeeping programs. The US provides money to other nations so they can supply soldiers for peacekeeping missions.¹²

Presidential Doctrine. A body of instruction used to make decisions. Foreign policy doctrine is a general statement of foreign policy made by a political leader. The purpose is to provide general rules for the conduct of foreign policy. The rules allow the leadership of a nation to deal with a situation. These start with public pronouncements and include other Presidential, Congressional, and Executive Branch policy.¹³

Reagan Doctrine. Anti-communist rebels must be supported because they oppose tyranny.

Rhodes Agreement. An armistice agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel signed 3 April 1949, at Rhodes based on the United Nations Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948.

San Remo Conference. 1920 meeting with the purpose of ratifying decisions made at the Paris peace conference of May, 1919. Representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, and Belgium met at San Remo, Italy, in April, 1920, to discuss problems arising from World War I. Members of the supreme council of the Allies took leading parts. Methods of executing the Treaty of Versailles (1919) were discussed, the basic features of a peace treaty with Turkey were adopted, and Class A mandates in the Middle East were allotted.¹⁴

Security Assistance. A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.¹⁵ Consists of the following four programs: Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, Economic Support Fund, and Peacekeeping Operations.

Security Assistance Organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions.

Third Country Transfers. The AECA authorizes the President to manage and approve the transfer of defense articles from the original recipient to a third country.

Transjordanians. Jordan national of Transjordan origin.¹⁶

Truman Doctrine. If one nation falls to a communist takeover, it will logically follow that its surrounding nations are also at risk for a communist takeover.

¹Peter Gubser, *Historical Dictionary of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, Asian Historical Dictionaries, No. 4. (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1991), 23.

²US Department of Defense, *The Management of Security Assistance* (known as the “Green Book”), (Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: USGPO, 2004). The latest edition changes posted to web site at (www.disam.dsca.mil), chapter 2 page 11.

³Ibid., chapter 2 page 9.

⁴Ibid., chapter 2, page 10.

⁵US DOD, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. (Washington, DC: USGPO, 12 April 2001 as amended through 9 June 2004), Web Address: (<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddct>).

⁶Combination of information from the following documents: The Coalition Information Centers, *The Global War on Terrorism: The First 100 Days*, (Washington, DC: USGPO), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.pdf>, accessed 13 December 2004; and US DOS and USAID, *Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2004-2009*, (Washington, DC: USGPO), <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/200/200mba.pdf>, accessed 13 December 2004.

⁷DOD, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

⁸Adan Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1999), xv.

⁹Milton-Edwards, Beverley and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East: Since 1945*, 2d ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), Glossary.

¹⁰Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, xv.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Department of Defense, *The Management of Security Assistance*, chapter 2 page 9.

¹³This definition came from three sources from Fact Index (<http://www.fact-index.com>). The following specific web addresses were accessed for foreign policy, US Presidential Doctrine and doctrine respectively ([/f/fo/foreign_policyDoctrine.html](http://www.fact-index.com/f/fo/foreign_policyDoctrine.html); [/l/li/list_of_u_s_presidential_doctrines.html](http://www.fact-index.com/l/li/list_of_u_s_presidential_doctrines.html); [/d/do/doctrine.html](http://www.fact-index.com/d/do/doctrine.html)), accessed on 3 November 2004.

¹⁴The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, accessed 12 January 2005 at <http://www.bartleby.com/65/sa/SanRemC.html>.

¹⁵DOD, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

¹⁶Abu-Odeh, *Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process*, xv.

APPENDIX A

TIMELINE OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN FROM 1916 TO PRESENT

The land now demarcated as Jordan has been inhabited for thousands of years, and it is the setting for much of Old Testament history. Brought under Ottoman rule in the 16th century, Jordan has been led only since the 1920s by Hashemite rulers, a family whose roots are in present-day Saudi Arabia. For almost a thousand years, the al Hashem clan had ruled the holy city of Mecca, as direct descendants of Mohammed. In 1916, Hussein ibn Ali, head of the al Hashem clan, launched the Arab revolt against the Ottoman rule and proclaimed himself “king of the Arab countries,” though the Allies only recognized him as ruler of the Hejaz, the western region of what is now Saudi Arabia. He declared himself the Caliph in 1924 but was forced to abdicate after a Wahabi invasion, led by Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. In the 1920s, Hussein’s sons Faisal and Abdullah became rulers of Iraq and Transjordan respectively. Hashemite rule ended in Iraq with a coup in 1958.

Table 7. Jordan Timeline

1915	Hussein-McMahon correspondence. Exchange of eight letters between Sherif Hussein and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt trying to establish spheres of territorial interest in Palestine. Conflicted with the Sykes-Picot.
1916	The Sykes-Picot Agreement secretly carved up the Levant into an assortment of monarchies, mandates and emirates. It enshrined Anglo-French imperialist ambitions at the end of WW I. Syria and Lebanon were put into the French orbit, while Britain claimed Jordan, Iraq, the Gulf States and the Palestinian Mandate.
1916	Hussein ibn Ali leads Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Part of the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire is defeated in World War I.
1920	Conference of San Remo creates British mandate of Palestine and French mandate of Syria. By 1922 the British agree to recognize Abdullah, Hussein’s second son, as ruler of Transjordan. Hussein’s eldest son, Faisal, is installed as King of Iraq in 1921. Transjordan becomes autonomous Emirate under British

mandate.

1921 At the Cairo Conference Britain and France carved up Arabia and created Jordan under Emir Abdullah; his brother Faisal became King of Iraq. France was given influence over Syria and Jewish immigration was allowed into Palestine. Faisal I died one year after independence and his son, Ghazi I succeeded him.

1922 The West Bank became an unallocated portion of the Palestine Mandate.

1923 Britain recognizes Transjordan as a national state being prepared for independence.

1924 3 March, In Turkey Kemal Ataturk forced the abolition of the Muslim caliphate through the protesting assembly and banned all Kurdish schools, publications and associations. This ended the Ottoman Empire and created the modern Middle East with Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia

1928 Transjordan constitution written and approved.

1936 Arab revolt in Palestine

1937 Peel Commission proposes Arab part of Palestine be joined to Transjordan

1946 The British mandate in Transjordan came to an end. Britain signed a treaty granting independence to Jordan. Jordan becomes kingdom as it proclaimed its new monarch, King Abdullah Ibn Ul-Hussein. Transjordan becomes Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan.

1947 Truman Doctrine

1947 November, UN Adopts Partition Plan for Palestine

1948 14-15 May, Israel declares independence. US recognize.

1948 15 May, Arab states attack Israel.

1948 Jordan occupies West Bank and old city of East Jerusalem as result of the Palestine war and gains population of 400,000 Palestinians and large refugee population. Jordan joins Arab League.

1949 February-July, US Mediated armistice agreements with Jordan and Israel.

1949 Name of the state changes to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The following year, parliament officially unites the West Bank and Jordan.

1950 24 April, Jordan annexed the West Bank and offered citizenship to all Palestinians wishing to claim it.

1951 20 July, Jordan's King Abdullah Ibn Hussein was assassinated in Jerusalem by a Palestinian nationalist. Prince Hussein (15) witnessed the murder. Crown Prince Talal became king with the assassination of his father.

1952 New Constitution promulgated.

1952 11 August, King Talal abdicated the throne to Prince Hussein due to mental illness.

1953 2 May, Prince Hussein became King Hussein (17) as he inherited the royal title from his father Talal.

1957 Eisenhower Doctrine

1957 Members of the National Guard, drawn mainly from the West Bank, attempt a coup; after putting down the coup, King Hussein bans political parties.

1957 April, US declares Jordan's independence and integrity were of vital interest to the US.

1958 King Hussein forged a federation with Iraq, which was led by his cousin, Faisal II. The federation soon failed when Faisal was killed during a revolution. Hussein invites British troops to help protect Jordan. U.S. begins supplying \$100 million in aid annually beginning in early 1960s.

1961 Kennedy Doctrine

1964 PLO Founded.

1965 Johnson Doctrine

1967 5 June, The Six Day War erupted in the Middle East as Israel, convinced an Arab attack was imminent, raided Egyptian military targets. Syria, Jordan and Iraq entered the conflict. Jordan lost the West Bank, an area of 2,270 sq. miles and gained 200,000 new refugees.

1968 Fatah, Palestinian resistance movement founded by Yassir Arafat.

1969 Nixon Doctrine

1970 September, Palestinian guerrillas of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine seized control of three jetliners, which were later blown up on the ground in Jordan after the passengers, and crews were evacuated. PLO leader Arafat threatened to make a cemetery of Jordan. King Hussein moved against PLO guerrillas. The PLO was driven out of Jordan and forced to move to Lebanon. Syria invades Jordan, and Hussein asks for help from U.S. and Britain. The PLO is expelled from Jordan by 1971. King Hussein sent a plea to Israel for air support via the British embassy. Israel did not respond. The Black September crisis left 2,000 people dead in 13 days of fighting.

1970 September, A cease-fire accord was signed in Cairo between the Jordanian army and Palestinian guerrillas by King Hussein and Yassir Arafat brokered by the Arab peace committee headed by Bahi Ladgham of Tunisia.

1971 The Palestine Liberation Organization arrived in Lebanon following its ouster from Jordan after losing the battles of "Black September."

1973 Egypt and Syria attack Israel in October on the Jewish Holy Day of Yom Kippur. In peace negotiations, Jordan demands but does not get return of West Bank and East Jerusalem from Israel.

1974 An Arab summit decided that King Hussein would no longer speak for the Palestinians and named the PLO under Yassir Arafat as the sole, legitimate representative.

1979 Iranian Revolution

1980 Carter Doctrine

1980 Iran-Iraq War

1982 6 June, Israel invades Lebanon

1982 1 September, President Reagan announces new US plan for Middle East peace calling for "Self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan."

1983 Reagan Doctrine

1985 Reagan Doctrine

1987 Hussein and Shimon Peres, Israel's foreign minister, agree to UN-sponsored conference to seek comprehensive peace. But in December Palestinians in the West Bank launch the intifada, an uprising against both Israeli and Jordanian

rule. In 1988, Jordan renounces its claims to the West Bank.

1988 4 June, Secretary of State George Shultz flew to Jordan, where he met with King Hussein. Afterward, Shultz said the Jordanian monarch was reluctant to engage in peace talks with Israel unless Israel agreed to give up land on the West Bank.

1988 31 July, In a televised speech, Jordan's King Hussein called for an independent Palestinian state in the Israeli-occupied territories as he told the Palestinians to take affairs into their own hands.

1989 Berlin Wall Comes Down

1990 2 August, Iraq invades Kuwait. State Department places hold on new LOAs for procurement of defense articles using FMF for Jordan.

1990 30 August, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar arrived in Jordan to try to mediate the Persian Gulf crisis.

1990 31 August, UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar met twice with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Amman, Jordan, trying to negotiate a solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.

1991 16 January, Air war starts.

1991 6 February, King denounces coalition. All defense articles and licensing to Jordan suspended.

1991 28 February, War ends.

1991 1 March, King speaks calling for Peace in the Middle East.

1991 4 March, DSAA suspends all US military assistance.

1991 7 March, Suspension (except for ammunition) is lifted.

1990- 1991 Because of economic ties and dependence on Iraq for oil, Jordan offers ostensible support to Iraq in first Gulf War and also tries to maintain neutrality. The rift with the West is ended within a couple years.

1991 21 July, Jordan became the fourth Arab country to sign on to a US-backed Middle East peace conference.

1992 13 January, Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian negotiators began talks in Washington on Palestinian autonomy.

1992 14 January, Historic Mideast peace talks continued in Washington, with Israel and Jordan holding their first-ever formal negotiations, and the Israelis continuing exchanges with Palestinian representatives.

1994 25 July, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Jordan's King Hussein signed a declaration at the White House ending their countries' 46-year-old formal state of war.

1994 8 August, Israel and Jordan opened the first road link between the two once-warring countries.

1994 17 October, Leaders of Israel and Jordan initialed a draft peace treaty.

1994 26 October, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel and Prime Minister Abdel Salam Majali of Jordan signed a peace treaty in a ceremony attended by President Clinton.

1995 The city of Amman was the site of the 1995 MENA Economic Summit.

1995 December, France just signed an accord with Jordan providing for joint war games and technical assistance as well as French training for the army and air

force.

1996 2 February, The leaders of Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians held an unprecedented summit in Cairo to try to revive the Mideast peace process.

1997 4 November, It was reported that Jordan receives \$225 million in annual aid from the US. Voter turnout reached only 54.5% and tribal leaders loyal to King Hussein won a majority of parliament, 47 of 80 lower house seats.

1998 20 October, King Hussein of Jordan joined Pres. Clinton to press for the Israeli-Palestinian compromise.

1998 Jordan received ok from the American CIA to sell 50,000 surplus AK-47 assault rifles to Peru. Many of the rifles went to leftist guerrillas in Colombia and Vladimiro Montesinos, Peru's spy chief, was implicated.

1999 22 January, King Hussein informed his brother Hassan that he would be removed as successor and would be appointed as a deputy. Hussein desired to move his own sons in line for the Crown.

1999 25 January, In Jordan King Hussein named his eldest son, Abdullah, as heir to the throne.

1999 5 February, In Jordan King Hussein was pronounced clinically dead but his heart continued and his family kept him on life support systems.

1999 7 February, In Jordan King Hussein (63) officially died from Hodgkin's lymphoma. He was succeeded by his eldest son, Abdullah.

1999 30 August, Police in Amman stormed offices linked to the radical Palestinian Hamas movement.

2000 20 March, Pope John Paul II arrived in Jordan for the beginning of his Holy land tour. He prayed at Mt. Nebo where the bible says Moses first viewed the Promised Land.

2000 28 March, Jordan with US intelligence help indicted 28 followers of Osama bin Laden for plotting attacks against American tourists in Dec.

2000 23 April, King Abdullah II made his first state visit to Israel and spent 4 hours in Eilat with Prime Minister Barak.

2001 10 April, Pres. Bush met with Jordan's King Abdullah and both agreed that ending violence in the Middle East was the main goal for the region.

2001 24 September, The US rewarded Jordan for its role in the anti-terrorist coalition with the passage of a free trade treaty.

2001 4 November, It was reported that some 400,000 Iraqis lived in Jordan, most of them refugees from the Gulf War, and that Iraqi intelligence agents operated there freely.

2001 9 November, King Abdullah II said his country would consider sending troops to Afghanistan to help the anti-terrorism coalition.

2002 12 March, In Amman US VP Cheney met with King Abdullah II, who expressed concern over any possible strike against Iraq.

2002 4 April, The UN released \$995 million in compensation to Kuwait for Iraq's 1990 invasion. Most went to 1,058 individuals. Saudi Arabia received \$82.6 million and Jordan received \$44.9.

APPENDIX B
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE

YEAR	LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT	BILL TITLE	RESULT
1947	Greek-Turkish Aid Bill	PL 80-75	First major commitment of Military and economic aid
1948	Marshall Plan	PL 80-472	Major commitment of economic aid to rebuild Europe
1949	Mutual Defense Act of 1949 (MDAA)	PL 81-329	Creates Military Assistance Program (MAP); creates authority for Foreign Military Cash Sales
1951	Mutual Security Act of 1951	PL 82-165	Establishes authority for military and economic assistance in one legislative vehicle; establishes basis for Economic Support Fund (ESF) concept
1954	Mutual Security Act of 1954	PL 83-665	Establishes basis for Foreign Military Credit Sales
1961	Foreign Assistance Act of 1961	PL 87-195	Makes major consolidation of all prior Security Assistance Programs in new legislative vehicle
1968	Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968	PL 90-629	Establishes separate legislative authority for Foreign Military Cash and Credit Sales Program
1976	International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976	PL 94-329	Creates Arms Export Control Act which consolidates existing legislation relating to US arms sales (cash or credit), government and commercial; establishes International Military and Education as separate program from MAP; Mandates phase-out of MAP
1978	International Security Act of 1978	PL 95-384	Establishes Economic Support Fund (ESF) as title for program previously known as Security Supporting Assistance, Supporting Assistance and Defense Support
1981	International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981	PL 97-113	Provides authority for a Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF) to facilitate procurement of high demand items in anticipation of foreign military sales to eligible nations
1985	International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985	PL 99-83	Amends the AECA and authorizes appropriations for 1986 and 1987. The last “traditional” security assistance act of the Cold War

Sources: (1981) Ernest Graves, and Steven A. Hildreth, *US Security Assistance: The Political Process* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), 183; and (1985) DISAM Greenbook at <http://disam.osd.mil/pubs/dr/greenbook /chapter3.htm>, Internet, accessed 13 May 2005.

APPENDIX C

MAPS OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE




Figure 3. Maps of Mandate Palestine

Source: Maps on-line; available from http://www.jewishnetwork.com/w/jewishnetwork_com/israel/020522_sanremo.asp; Internet; accessed 12 January 2005.

APPENDIX D
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM 1951 TO 2002

Table 8. US Military Assistance to Jordan

	Military Assistance Program (MAP) Grants	Transfer from Excess Stock	International Military Education & Training	Economic Loans	Economic Grants
1951					.1
1952					5.1
1953					2.9
1954					12.9
1955					8.9
1956					8.1
1957					22.1
1958	11.2	.5	.1		37.4
1959				3.7	59.6
1960	5.2		.2		52.1
1961	3.8	.2		1	66.9
1962	2.9	.2	.1		46
1963	4.5		.1		56.3
1964	3.7	1.4	.1		49.5
1965	3.6	5.4	.1	1.6	41.2
1966	4.1	3.1	.2	8.5	37.1
1967	12.4	1.9	.1	6.6	38.9
1968	.2		.2	1.8	17.2
1969			.2	1.3	10.3
1970			.2		3.9
1971	28.3	1	.2	1.2	15.6
1972	39.6	5.9	.5	1.7	57.7
1973	35.4	18.8	.7	15.9	55.2
1974	39.8	5.2	.6	15.6	48.9
1975	68.8	4.7	1	25	74.3
1976	54.4		.8	37.6	110.9
1977	54.4	.5	1	30.3	53.3
1978	55		1.4	54	48.9
1979	41		1.6	63.1	37.6
1980	28.3		1	31	41.8
1981	1.4		.8		10.5
1982			2	10	5.4
1983			1.3	10	10.1
1984			1.7	7	13
1985			1.9	5	95
1986			1.8		95.3
1987	39.9		2	2	109.1
1988	26.5		1.8	5.7	18.5
1989			1.8		16
1990			2.1		45.1
1991			1.1		70.6
1992			.6	20	9.4
1993			.5	25.6	65.4
1994			.8	18.7	28.3
1995			1	1.2	12.3
1996	100		1.2	25.3	7.2
1997	20.6		1.7	25	127.7
1998	25		1.6		88.3

1999	25		1.7		214.2
2000			1.7		247.1
2001			1.7		178.3
2002			2		270.1
2003			2.4		604
2004			2.9		204

Note: 1989 received \$10 million for “Other Military Grants” and in 2001 and 2002 received \$900,000 and \$1.6 million, respectively for nonproliferations, antiterrorism, demining, and related programs.

APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

The author was stationed at the American Embassy in Amman, Jordan, from October 1995 to June 1997 in the Military Assistance Program (MAP) Office. His initial duty was Foreign Military Sales officer, and the last year he was the Army Section Chief as well as the FMS officer. He oversaw the US Army's security assistance operations and was involved in training, demining, and, humanitarian assistance programs. He was the executor of US security assistance policy towards Jordan from the US Army perspective. The author deployed to Kuwait and Iraq as part of Task Force Ironhorse from 10 March 2003 to 6 February 2004, entering Iraq on 13 April 2003. He was the Support Operations Officer in the 64th Corps Support Group that supported the 4th Infantry Division. One aspect of his job was overseeing the destruction of enemy ammunition stocks. On 11 August 2003, he was looking at a complex situated north of Bayji (north of Tikrit) and found in one of the bunkers hundreds of cases of US made ammunition stamped with the Jordanian Army's seal. In other words this ammunition was sold to the Jordanians by the US and then somehow transferred to Iraq. Lastly, he is interested in the general makeup of the Middle East and what keeps it together. This comes from three tours to the area (Saudi Arabia for Desert Shield and Desert Storm (September 1990 to April 1991), Jordan (October 1995 to June 1997), and Kuwait and Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 2003 to February 2004)). Travels (personal and professional) in the area to include Israel, Syria, Lebanon, and Qatar help solidify the interest here.

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